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I. FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO THE NEED FOR UNIFORM LAW
The origin of the industrialized nations' need to comply with a specific
economic policy designed to "transcend national borders in order to
maximize the utilization of resources"1 originated from the consequences of
the Industrial Revolution and, more specifically, from over-production due
to the ensuing industrial growth.2 This economic policy "required a
correspondent legislative policy able to regulate the economic relationships:
this policy, not unlike the economic Policy, had to cross national borders."'
It is for this reason that since the end of the last century and with increasing
intensity since the beginning of this century,4 efforts have been made to
"create an internationally uniform discipline for cases linked to a plurality of
countries."' By doing so, one intended to overcome the nationality of law,
both private and commercial, which originated from the emergence of
national states in Europe and from the enactment of the first codes6 (such
as the Scandinavian codes, the French code and the Austrian code). The
Daniela Memmo, Il contratto di vendita internazionale nel diritto uniforme, 37 RIVISTA
TRIMEsTRALE DI DIRTro Lr PROCEDuRA CiviLE [Riv. TRIM. DiR. PRoc. Civ.] 180, 181
(1983).
2 For similar reasoning, see MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADmONS IN A NUTsHELL 23 (1982), where the authors state that "as Europe emerged from
the relative economic stagnation of the Middle Ages... there appeared the need for a body
of law to govern business transactions."
3 FRANc sco GALoANo, IL DIRIrro PRIVATO FRA CODICE E CoSTruzIoNE 47 (2d ed.
1980).
' A similar affirmation can be found in RuDoLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW
31 (5th ed. 1987), where the author states that at the beginning of this century "there arose
a strong movement favoring ... the total or at least substantial unification of all civilized
legal systems."
5 Sergio Carbone and Marco Lopez de Gonzalo, Art. 1, in CONVENZIONE Dl VIENNA SUI
CoNTRATn DI VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE DI BENI MOBILI 2 (Cesare Massimo Bianca ed.,
1991).
6 In regard to the consequences of the enactment of the first codes, see RENA DAVID &
JOHN BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 63-67 (3d ed. 1985), where
the authors state that "codes were treated, not as new expositions of the 'common law of
Europe,' but as mere generalisations or new editions of 'particular customs' raised to a
national level .... [T]hey were regarded as instruments of a nationalisation of law." Id.
at 66.
A similar affirmation can also be found in ALDO FRIGNANI, IL CONTRATIO INTERNAZmo-
NALE 9 (1990) and Rene David, 1l Diritto del Commercio Internazionale: Un Nuovo Compito
per i Legislatori Nazionali o Una Nuova Lex Mercatoria?, 22 RiVISTA DI DIRITrO CIVILE
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enactment of these codes infringed upon the transnational character of the
law previously in force which constituted a real lex universalisS: the so-
called lex mercatoria.9 This consisted of a practical body of law grounded
in usages whose particularity consisted in having been created by the
merchants' courts in order to solve problems related to commerce.
It is to the creation of a similar law, a droit corporatif international,'°
that both economists and legal scholars direct their efforts. One assists, in
other words, in the creation of a "new law merchant"" in order to over-
come what has been defined as "anarchy upon which international relation-
ships are based."'" Such a law would overcome the nationality of the law
which constitutes "an obstacle to economic relationships which constantly
increase among citizens of different countries; an obstacle above all for the
[RIv DiR. Civ.] 577 (1976).
' For a similar definition of the law in force previous to the modem codes, see MICHAEL
J. BONELL, LE REGoLE OGGETIVE DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 4 (1976).
9 The expression lex mercatoria seems to be first used in an English collection called
Fleta; for similar statements, see Herbert Bilck, Betrachtungen uber ein Volkerhandelsrecht,
ZErrscHRIFr FOR HANDELSRECHT 150, 159 (1868); Helmut Pohlmann, Die Quellen des
Handelsrechts, in 1 HANDBUCH DER QUELLEN UND LrrERATUR DER NEUEREN EUROPAIsCHEN
PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE 801, 814 (Helmut Coing ed., 1973).
Thereafter, the term was used in GERARD MALYNES, CONSUEUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA
(1622). For a reference to this book, see, for example, Reinhard Zimmermann, Der
europilische Charakter des englischen Recht Historische Verbindungen zwischen Civil Law
und Common Law, ZETrSCHRIFr FOR EuRoPkisciES PRIVATRECHT 4, 30 (1993).
The modem concept as well as the rediscovery of the aforementioned expression is linked
to Professor Berthold Goldman's writings; for a discussion of Professor Goldman's influence
on the revival of the concept of lex mercatoria, see, for example, FILip DE LY, INTERNATON-
AL BUSiNESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 211 (1992).
10 This expression has been used by Edouard Lambert, Sources du Droit Compard ou
Supranational. Lgislation Uniforme et Jurisprudence Comparative, in 3 RECEUIL D'tTUDES
SUR LES SOURCES DU DRorr EN L'HONNER DE FRANCOIS GNY 478, 499 (1934), who used
it in a similar sense in which one today uses lex mercatoria.
" The theory of the "new law merchant" has been developed by Professor Schmitthoff
who "emphasized the specific character of international business law, where international
conventions, uniform laws and usages have a prominent place." DE LY, supra note 9, at 209.
See, e.g., Clive Schmitthoff, International Business aw: A New Law Merchant, in 2
CURRENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129 (1961); Clive Schmitthoff, Das Neue Recht des
Welthandels, 28 RABELS ZErrSCHRiFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATREcLHT 47 (1964).
For a collection of articles written by Professor Schmitthoff, see CLIVE M SCHMrrrHOFF'S
SELECr ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Chia-Jui Cheng ed. 1988).
12 RENt DAVID, I GRANDi SISTEMI GiURIDIcI CONTEMPORANEI 9 (1980).
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enterprises that are involved in international commerce and that acquire
primary resources or distribute goods in different countries which all have
different law.,
13
II. THE LEx MERCATORIA
However, even though the trend towards unification of the law governing
transnational commerce characterizes the direction twentieth century law is
taking, the trend can be traced back to the Middle Ages where it gave rise
to the law merchant, 4 "a body of truly international customary rules
governing the cosmopolitan community of international merchants who
travelled through the civilised world from port to port and fair to fair."' s
This law had five characteristics: "1) it was transnational; 2) its principal
source was mercantile customs; 3) it was administered not by professional
judges but by merchants themselves; 4) its procedure was speedy and
informal; and 5) it stressed equity, in the medieval sense of fairness, as an
overriding principle."'"
Some authors state that the lex mercatoria may be considered a revival of
even older traditions, such as the ius gentium.' However, even though
there may be some common features-both ius gentium's and today's lex
mercatoria refer to transnational trade relations' 9 -this theory can be
questioned for several reasons. Above all, the Roman ius gentium, unlike the
13 Francesco Galgano, I1 Diritto Uniforme: La Vendita Internazionale, in ATLANTE DI
DUrro PRIVATO COMPARATO 211, 211 (Francesco Galgano & Franco Ferrari eds., 1992).
"' According to DE LY, supra note 9, at 15 n.33, "[t]he medieval law merchant is also
referred to as lex mercatoria, ius mercatorum, ius mercatorium, ius mercati, ius fori, ins
forense, ius negotiatorum, ius negotiale, stilus mercatorum or ius nundinarum."
'" Clive Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, 1968 J. Bus. L.
105, 105 (1968).
'6 Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 221, 225 (1978).
17 For a similar statement, see BERTHoLD GOLDMAN, LEX MERCATORIA 3 (Deventer,
without date).
IS lus gentium in the sense discussed in the text has been defined as quod naturalis ratio
inter omnes homines constituit ... quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur, Inst. 1.2.1.
" Even this theory has been questioned; according to 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,
TRAITIf DE DROrr ROMAIN 405 et seq. (1840), it also applied among Roman citizens.
[Vol. 24:183
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new law merchant, did not constitute an autonomous set of rules,20 but
rather a part of Roman law.2'
However, although the revival of this ancient' trend towards unification
has been criticized by legal scholars,' the trend seems irreversible, as
evidenced by the fact that in some systems the new lex mercatoria has been
recognized not only by legal scholars, but also by courtse and arbitration
tribunals' as well as by the legislature. In China, for example, Article 5(3)
of the Statute of March 21, 1985 on Transnational Economic Contracts 1
refers to the general principles of transnational commerce as the applicable
20 As for a detailed comparison between the new lex mercatoria and the ius gentium, see
DE LY, supra note 9, at 9-15. The author points out that "it is hard... to conceive of ius
gentium as a precedent for a present-day autonomous law of international trade." Id. at 10-11.
21 Legal scholars have often pointed out that ius gentium's binding force derives from its
being a part of Roman law; see, e.g., W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW 19 (1931); WERNER KUNKEL, ROMIScHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 72 (6th ed. 1972);
LEOPOLD WENGER, DER HEUTIGE STAND DER ROMISCHEN RECHTsWissENscHAFr 4 (2nd ed.
1970).
" See for a similar statement, R. H. Graveson, The International Unification of Law, 16
AM. J. COMp. L. 4 (1968), where the author states that "It]he international process of
assimilating the diverse legal systems of various countries goes back into ancient history."
23 For a criticism, see, for example, id. at 5-6, where the author stresses that "[i]t may be
necessary to correct the assumption that uniform law is good in itself and that the process of
unification is one to be encouraged in principle."
24 As for decisions supposedly recognizing the lex mercatoria, see, for example, in Italy,
the decision of the Cassazione Civile of February 8, 1982, RVSTA DI Dmrro INTERNAZION-
ALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 829 (1982); in England, the decision Deutsche Schachtbau- und
Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. R'As Al Khamaih National Oil Company, [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023
(Court of Appeal); in Switzerland, the decision of the Court of Appeal of Zurich of May 9,
1985, BLATTER FOR ZORICHER RECHTSPRECHUNG 44 (1986).
' As far as a discussion of the recognition of the lex mercatoria by arbitration tribunals
is concerned, see, for example, Klaus Berger, Lex Mercatoria in der Internationalen
Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Der Fall "Compania Valencia," PRAXIS DES INTERNATIO-
NALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 281 (1993); DE LY, supra note 9, at 255-66; Ole
Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 747 (1985); Jean Paulsson, La Lex Mercatoria dans l'Arbitrage C.C.L, 1990 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 55; Bernd von Hoffmann, "L.ex Mercatoria" vor Internationalen Schiedsgerich-
ten, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 106 (1984); PETER F.
WEISE, LEX MERCATORIA. MATERIELLES REcHT VOR DER INTERNATIONALEN HANDELS-
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKErr (1990).
2 For an English version of the law on Transnational Economic Contracts, see 34 AM.
J. COMP. L. 715 (1986).
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law, absent choice of law,27 a provision which has been considered as being
a legislative reference to the lex mercatoria.'
The same phenomenon can also be found in Holland where a new article
was introduced into the Civil Procedure Code, Article 1054,29 according to
which in international cases the arbitrators, absent choice of law, "may apply
the lex mercatoria ... define[d] ... as generally accepted usages in
international trade, which are autonomous from national law."' Therefore,
this provision can be interpreted as recognizing the lex mercatoria on a
legislative level.3
From the statements made up to now one can draw two conclusions: it
is certain that a tendency exists towards the increase of international
exchange and that this tendency can be satisfied, in view of the "increasing
dissatisfaction with statutory regulation, 32 only through a "universal
uniform regulation, 33 for the attainment of which one can make recourse
to a variety of techniques,3' which, however, will not be discussed in this
See for a reference to the statute mentioned in the text, DE LY, supra note 9, at 249
n.221.
" Article 5(3) of the Statute on Transnational Economic Contracts has been interpreted
as a reference to the law merchant for example by Norbert Horn, Das Chinesische
Auflenwirtschaftsvertragsgesetz von 1985, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 688,
691 (1985).
" This Article was inserted into the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure by the Dutch
Arbitration Act of July 2, 1986; for the text of the Arbitration Act, see TUDSCHRIFr VOOR
ARBrrRAGE 213 (1986).
" De Ly, supra note 9, at 250 (footnote omitted).
31 This Article and consequently the recognition of the lex mercatoria has been criticized
on the ground that the debate regarding the lex mercatoria not being over, the legislator
should not have taken any position; see for this criticism R. VAN DER VELDEN, LEx
MERCATORIA OR IUS COMMUNE? 18 (1986).
Skepticism towards the new provision has been expressed by other authors as well; see,
e.g., Aron Broches, The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration: An Exercise in International Legislation, 1987 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 46 (1987); A. J. van den Berg, Wetsontwerp Nieuwe Arbitragewet,
TUDSCHRIFr VOOR ARBITRAGE 200 (1984).
32 Memmo, supra note 1, at 182.
33 BONELL, supra note 8, at 5.
For a discussion of the various techniques used to achieve unification, see, for example,
Rend David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMp. L. 13 (1968); Rend David, The
International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW Ch.5, 107-109 (1971).
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III. HISTORICAL REMARKS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW36
The sales contract being the "mercantile contract par excellence"37 and
therefore being the "pillar of the entire system of commercial relations, 38
it necessarily plays an important role in the ambit of growing international
trade as well. This is especially true if one considers how many other
contracts are related to it.39 This underlines the necessity of unifying the
substantive law of sales on an international level.
And this necessity has been felt very early: indeed, already at the end of
the 1920's, Ernst Rabel ° suggested to the Governing Council of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) 4' that
it start with the work for the unification of the law of international sales of
" However, one should note that "[i]nternational unification of law has been [generally]
approached by doctrine through two means, international conventions and model acts. At
times states have bound themselves within certain limits to apply given uniform rules to
certain categories of relationships. At other times, the only resort was to persuasion that
states would conform their law to a certain model without any international obligation."
David, The Methods of Unification, supra note 34, at 19.
' For a survey on the history of the different steps which lead to the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention, see E. Allan Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18 INT'L
LAW. 17 (1984); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989); John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Trade -
Progress and Prospects, 20 INT'L LAw. 635 (1986); Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna Sales
Convention: History and Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS; DUBROVNIK
LEcruRs 1 (Petar Sarcevic and Paul Volken eds., 1986) [hereinafter International Sale of
Goods].
3 GALOANO, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis added).
Memmo, supra note 1, at 181.
For a similar affirmation, see Berman & Kaufman, supra note 16, at 229, where the authors
state that "[i]n international trade, the sales contract is the core of an export-import
transaction."
" See for a similar statement, Berman & Kaufman, supra note 16, at 229: "[The sales
contract] is... always supported by several other related contracts, reflecting the complexity
of the transaction and the number of Parties involved."
o Ernst Rabel's role has been stressed by several authors; see, e.g., Michael J. Bonell,
Introduction to the Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW; THE
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 3 (Cesare M. Bianca and Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987).
"' The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) was set up
in Rome in 1926 under the aegis of the League of Nations.
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goods. Upon this suggestion, UNIDROIT decided to undertake the necessary
preparatory studies that consequently led to the appointment of a commission
entrusted with the elaboration of a uniform law42 and, in 1935, to the first
draft of a uniform law on the sale of goods43 that already distinguished
between the provisions related to the duties of the contracting parties and
those governing the formation of such contracts."
Work had to be interrupted as a result of World War II 4' but resumed
in 1951 with a conference at the Hague where a new draft uniform law
was presented. Other drafts followed this, 47 the last of which formed the
subject of the Diplomatic Conference held at the Hague from the first to the
twenty-fifth of April, 1964. Twenty-eight States participated and approved
two conventions," creating respectively the Uniform Law on the Interna-
4 For further details relating to the composition of the commission mentioned in the text,
see Peter Schlechtriem, Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des Einheitskaufrechts, in EINHErICHES
KAUFRECHT UND NATiONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT 28 n.6 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 1987).
' For a comment on this draft, see Ernst Rabel, Der Entwurf eines Einheitlichen
Kaufgesetzes, RABELS ZErrscHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT-
RECHT 3 (1935).
" See also Schlechtriem, supra note 42, at 28.
45 See Note, A Practitioner's Guide to the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods, 16 INT'L L. & POL. 81, 85 (1983).
' As for more specific details on the 1951 Hague Conference (January 1-10), see, for
ecample, Pietro de Martino, La vendita internazionale di cose mobili secondo un progetto di
legge uniforme, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE Ill (1952); Ernst Rabel, Die Haager
Konferenz iiber die Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, 17 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AUSIANDISCHEs UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 212 (1952); Ernst Rabel, The Hague
Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 58 (1952).
"" In 1956, another draft was published; for a comment on this draft, see Ernst Rabel, Der
Entwurf zur Internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, 22 RABELS ZEITScHRIFr FOR
AUSLANDIscHEs UND INTERNATiONALES PR1VATRECHT 16 (1957). Other drafts followed; see
for more detailed information, Bonell, supra note 40, at 4; Schlechtriem, supra note 42, at
29 n.12.
" For comments on the 1964 Hague Conference and its results, see, among others, Ernst
von Caemmerer, Die Haager Konferenz fiber die internationale Vereinheitlichung des
Kaufrechts vom 2.-25. April 1964: Die Ergebnisse der Konferenz hinsichtlich der
Vereinheitlichung des Rechts des Abschlusses von Kaufvertragen, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALEs PRIVATEcHT 101 (1965); Gyula E6rsi, The Hague
Conventions of 1964 and the International Sale of Goods, ACTA JURIDICA ACADEMIAE
SCIENTIARUM HUNGAmICAE 321 (1969); John 0. Honnold, The 1964 Hague Conventions and
Uniform Laws on the International Sale of Goods, 13 AM J. COMP. L. 451 (1964); John 0.
Honnold, The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of
1964, 30 LAW CONTEmP. PRoBS. 326 (1965); Philippe Kahn, La convention de la Haye du
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tional Sale of Goods (ULIS)49 and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF).m
These laws, even though they constituted the most important point of
reference for the discipline of international trade in that era, were not as
successful as expected." Indeed, they were given force in only nine
countries, 2 only one-third of the states which participated at the Hague
Conference. Such failure53 can in part be attributed to the scarce role that
both Socialist and the Third World countries played in the elaboration and
ler juillet 1964 portant loi uniforme sur la vente internationale des objets mobiliers
corporels, 17 REvUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROrr COMMERCIAL 689 (1964); KOMMErrAR ZUM
EINHEmrLICHEN KAUFRECHT (Hans D61le ed., 1976); Otto Riese, Die Haager Konferenz aber
die internationale Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechtsvom 2. bis 25. April 1964. Verlauf der
Konferenz und Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der materiellen Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts, 29
RA.ELs ZEITscHRIFT FOR AUSLANDisCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 1 (1965);
R.H. GRAVESON ET AL., THE UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES ACT 1967 (1968);
UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (John 0. Honnold ed.,
1966).
" See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law of International Sale of Goods, July 1,
1964, with Annex, Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 109,
reprinted in 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 453 (1964).
'o See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, with Annex, Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in 13 AM. J.
COMP. L. 472 (1964).
sI For a similar evaluation, see, for example, Michael J. Bonell, La convenzione di Vienna
sulla vendita internazionale: origine, scelte e principi fondamentali, 44 RIv. TRIM. DIR.
PROC. CIv. 715, 716 (1990); BURGHARD PILT/, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT. DAS UN-
KAUFRECHT (WIENER OBEREINKOMMEN VON 1980) IN PRAXISORIENTIERTER DARsTELLUNO
8 (1993).
52 The Hague Conventions were enacted in Belgium, Great Britain, Federal Republic of
Germany, Gambia, Holland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg and San Marino. Note that according
to Isaak I. Dore and James E. Defranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of
the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 49, 50 (1982), the ULIS was enacted only in eight states. For
a list of only eight contracting states, see also Harold J. Berman, The Law of International
Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 J. INT'L DIsp. RESOL. 235, 290 n.160 (1988).
" One must note, however, that where the 1964 Hague Conventions were enacted, they
played a very important role, since the courts paid much attention to them. For a collection
of the court decisions relating to the aforementioned Conventions, see PETER ScHLECHTRiEM
and ULRICH MAGNUS, INTERNATIONALE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM EKG UND EAG (1987).
1994]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
compilation of the aforementioned Conventions,' and which resulted in
those countries' refusal to enact the 1964 Hague Conventions which they
considered as being modelled on the sole exigencies of the industrialized
nations.55
The continuing dissatisfaction produced by the foregoing laws was
manifested not only in the already-noted scarce number of contracting states,
but also in the refusal on the part of other states, such as the United States'
' For a similar evaluation of the role of the Socialist and Third World countries, see
PILTZ, supra note 51, at 7.
"' A similar justification of the Socialist and Third World countries' refusal to enact the
1964 Hague Conventions can be found in Stephen Bainbridge, Note, Trade Usages in
International Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 VA.
J. INT'L L. 619, 632 (1984), where it is stated that the Third World and Socialist states
"objected to the domination of the [1964 Hague] Conference by the developed Western
European nations, asserting that the domination resulted in a ULIS Convention strongly
favoring the industrial states" (footnotes omitted).
For similar statements, see also Newell E. Cumming, Comment, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law: Will a Uniform Law in International Sales Finally
Emerge?, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 157, 165 (1979); Martin L. Ziontz, Comment, A New
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods: Is it compatible with American Interests?,
2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 129, 134 (1980).
' The reasons the United States "did not seriously consider ratification of either the ULIS
or its companion Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts," Bainbridge, supra note 55,
at 620,
have been summarized as follows:
[t]he United States was unable to participate in the drafting effort because
it could not be represented at the conference until it had been authorized
by Congress to become a member of the Rome Institute [UNIDROIT].
The authorization was given by a joint resolution of Congress, Act of
Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-224, 77 Stat. 775 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
269(g) (1976). Thus, the United States delegation, having barely three
months to prepare for the conference, stated that "there was no possibility
of arranging for a comprehensive review of the legal issues involved with
a view to formulating positions to be taken by the United States
Government at the Conference."
Dore & Defranco, supra note 52, at 50 n.4.
And that is why the United States delegation concluded that "it would appear unlikely that
the Uniform Act will prove acceptable to America's governmental, commercial, and legal
organizations because its many unclear and unworkable provisions do not meet the current
needs of commerce and because it varies so markedly in its approach and content from our
Uniform Commercial Code." KEARNEY, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 10 (1981).
[Vol. 24:183
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and France, to ratify those conventions. This led, still before their enactment
in 1972, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), 7 established by the United Nations in 196658 with the task
of promoting the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of
international trade by promoting wider participation in existing international
conventions and wider acceptance of existing model and uniform laws, to
attempt the revision of the Hague Uniform Laws. However, when it became
apparent that such uniform laws would not be accepted without substantial
alterations, "[a] fourteen-member Working Group was established to begin
drafting a new text." '59
In the following years, UNCITRAL proposed various drafts, the last of
which--dating back to 19786R---was the draft upon which the General
Assembly of the United Nations authorized the convening of a diplomatic
conference,6 held from March 10 to April 11, 1980 in Vienna. At the end
57 For UNCITRAL's history, its structure, and its goals, see E. Allan Farnsworth,
UNCITRAL-Why? What? How? When?, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 314 (1972); Gerold Herrmann,
The Contribution of UNCITRAL to the Development of International Trade, in THE
TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 35 (Norbert Horn
& Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982); John 0. Honnold, The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (1979).
For UNCITRAL's contribution to the development of a uniform law on international sales,
see Rolf Herber, Die Arbeiten des Ausschusses der Vereinten Nationen fUr internationales
Handelsrecht (UNCITRAL), RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 577 (1974); Kazuaki
Sono, UNC1TRAL and the Vienna Sales Convention, 18 INT'L LAw. 7 (1984); Kazuaki Sono,
The Role of UNCITRAL, in INTERNATIONAL SALES. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 4-1 (Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit
eds., 1984) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SALES].
"See G. A. Res. 2205, reprinted in 1 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 65 (1970).
"Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 635.
For the reasons which led to the drafting of a new text, see also JOHN 0. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
53-54 (2d ed. 1991), where the author states that "[t]he crucial question was this: Would it
be possible to obtain widespread adoption of the 1964 Conventions? ... It became evident
that the 1964 Conventions, despite the valuable work they reflected, would not receive
adequate adherence.... UNCITRAL thereupon established a Working Group of 14 States
... and requested the Working Group to prepare a [new] text."
60 Whereas earlier drafts distinguished between the rules relating to the formation of
international sales contracts and those relating to the rights and obligations arising from
international sales contracts, this draft was a result from the Commission's decision "to
integrate the draft convention on the formation of contracts and the draft convention on
international sale of goods into a simple text." Sono, supra note 36, at 5.
61 See Bonell, supra note 40, at 6; HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 54.
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of the conference, which was attended by representatives of 62 States,6 2
after the Convention had been voted upon in Plenary article by article,63 it
was, as a whole, submitted to a roll-call vote and was approved unanimously.
The Convention, which is officially' known as the "United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," came into
force January 1, 1988.
Today, this example of a so-called self-executing treaty,65 is in force in
more than thirty States, among which are some of the major commercial
' The 62 States encompassed all countries with significant commercial interests.
International organizations attended the Vienna Conference as well. The international
organizations were: the Hague Conference on Private International Law; UNIDROIT, ICC,
the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, World Bank, Bank for
International Settlements and the Central Office for International Railway Transport.
6 For a more detailed reference to the rules of the Conference governing the approval
process, see HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 56.
" Even though several translations can be found, there are only six official versions of
the "United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" [hereinafter
CISG]: the English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Chinese versions. The official
versions are reprinted in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 40,
at 681-806; THE CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A HANDBOOK OF
THE BASIC MATERIALS 169-246 (Daniel Barstow Magraw & Reed R. Kathrein eds., 2d ed.
1990). The English text is reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987); 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
For this qualification, V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of
the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U.
Prr. L. REV. 197, 204 note 39 (1988) ("There are two types of treaties: those that are self-
executing and those that are not self-executing. A self-executing treaty 'operates of itself,
without the aid of any legislative provision'-without any enabling legislation. Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). The Convention is a self-executing treaty."
(emphasis added)).
Paul Volken, The Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 36, at 20, defines the CISG as a self-executing
treaty, but he stresses that it constitutes a law-making treaty as opposed to a contractual treaty
and that "[i]n this respect [it] differ[s] from the Hague Conventions of 1 July 1964 which, in
fact, did not contain any rules on contracts. All they did was to oblige the Contracting States
to incorporate the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) or the Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (U.L.F.) into their own
domestic legislation." Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
Note, however, that there are also countries which do not regard the Vienna Sales
Convention as being a self-executing treaty, since they regard a convention as executing only
if enacted by their legislature. This is true, for instance, in England.
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partners of the United States, such as China, France, Germany, and Italy.66
IV. THE HAGUE AND VIENNA CONVENTIONS:
STRUCTURAL DIVERSITY AND COMMON FEATURES
As evidenced by what has so far been discussed, the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention and the 1964 Hague Conventions represent the most important
attempts to create a uniform law on international sales, even though there
have been other attempts as well. It is sufficient to remember that in 1953
in Latin America the "Proyecto de Buenos Aires" was published. The
"Proyecto" was a skeletal Convention with the objective of unifying the
discipline of international sales within the members of the Organization of
American States. 7
As far as the Hague and Vienna Conventions are concerned, it must be
noted that they differ from each other not only in regard to substantial
issues-even though there are subjects dealt with in the same manner in the
various Conventions"--but also as far as their compilation technique is
concerned,' which results in a more simple text of the 1980 Vienna Sales
6The CISG came into force in Argentina (Jan. 1, 1988); Australia (Apr. 1, 1989); Austria
(Jan. 1, 1989); Belarus (Nov. 1, 1989); Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mar. 6, 1992); Bulgaria (Aug.
1, 1991); Canada (May 1, 1992); Chile (Mar. 1, 1991); China (Jan. 1, 1988); Czech Republic
(Jan. 1, 1993); Denmark (Mar. 1, 1990); Ecuador (Feb. 1, 1993); Egypt (Jan. 1, 1988);
Estonia (Oct. 1, 1994); Finland (Jan. 1, 1989); France (Jan. 1, 1988); Germany (Jan. 1, 1991);
Guinea (Feb. 1, 1992); Hungary (Jan. 1, 1988); Iraq (April 1, 1991); Italy (Jan. 1, 1988);
Lesotho (Jan. 1, 1988); Mexico (Jan. 1, 1989); the Netherlands (Jan. 1, 1992); Norway (Aug.
1, 1989); Romania (June 1, 1992); Russian Federation (Sept. 1, 1991); Slovakia (Jan. 1,
1993); Slovenia (June 25, 1991); Spain (Aug. 1, 1991); Sweden (Jan. 1, 1989); Switzerland
(Mar. 1, 1991); Syrian Arab Republic (Jan. 1, 1988); Uganda (Mar. 1, 1993); Ukraine (Feb.
1, 1991); United States (Jan. 1, 1988); Yugoslavia (Jan. 1, 1988); Zambia (Jan. 1, 1988).
For a list of the contracting states which also includes a list of the reservations made by
the states, see Journal of Law & Commerce CISG Contracting States and Declarations Table,
12 J. L. & COM. 285 (1993).
67 For a more detailed reference to the "Proyecto de Buenos Aires", see ALEJANDRO M.
GARRO & G. ZUPPI, COMPRAVENTA INTERNATIONAL DE MERCADERIAS 41 (1990); PILTrz,
supra note 51, at 7.
" The formation of contracts, for example, is governed by similar rules in the U.L.F. and
the Vienna Sales Convention. For a similar affirmation, see, for example, FRANCO FERRARI,
LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE. PARTE I. AMBrTO DI APPLICAZIONE. DIsPOsIZIoNi GENERAU
15 (1994) (stating that in its outlines, Part II of the 1980 Convention corresponds to the ULF).
(9 This has been also pointed out by Memmo, supra note 1, at 188.
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Convention. 0 Indeed, besides having reduced the number of the provi-
sions, the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention consolidated the provisions on the
formation of contracts and those on the rights and duties of the par-
ties-which earlier were divided into two different texts, the ULIS and
ULF 71-in a single text.
Despite many differences,72 the Hague and Vienna Conventions have
some common features: they only apply to contracts for the sale of goods
which have international character,73 a choice that has often been criti-
cized, 4 even though it is just such character from which the uniform sales
law derives the greatest interest.75 It was said, for example, that the
creation of a special body of rules governing contracts for the international
sale of goods could not be justified any longer, since the "substantial
differences between import and export transactions and the purchase and sale
0 For an evaluation of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention in terms of "major simplicity,"
see also Ulrich Magnus, Reform des Haager Einheitskaufrechts, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
REcHTsPoLmK 129 (1978).
71 As for the reasons which induced the drafters to differentiate between the provisions
on the rights and duties of the parties and those on the formation of contracts, see Michael
J. Bonell, La revisione del diritto uniforme della vendita internazionale, RIVISTA DI DIRrITO
COMMERCIALE 120 (1980).
2 As for a comparison between the 1964 Hague Conventions and the 1980 Vienna
Convention, see, for example, Bainbridge, supra note 55, passim; F. J. A. van der Velden,
The Law of International Sales: The Hague Conventions 1964 and the Uncitral Uniform
Sales Code 1980-Some Main Items Compared, in 4 HAGUE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 46 (C. C. A.
Voskuil & J. A. Wade eds., 1983).
' However, it has been pointed out that even though the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention
intends to lay down the rules for the mere international sales contract, it provides for some
rules which could be applicable to all kinds of transnational business contracts; for this
affirmation, see Aleksandar Goldstajn, Usages of Trade and other Autonomous Rules of
International Trade According to the UN (1980) Sales Convention, in INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS, supra note 36, at 55, where the author states that "[t]he United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (1980), although formally confined to contracts
for the international sale of goods, contains provisions which could be applied to all kinds of
international commercial transactions." There are different reasons for this view, one of
which is "that this Convention, which deals with international commercial contracts, includes
some general provisions that in domestic legislation belong to the general part of the law of
contract." Id.
' For a discussion of such criticism, see, above all, Michael J. Bonell, La convenzione
di Vienna sulla vendita internazionale: origine, scelte e principifondamentali, 44 Riv. TRIM.
DiR. PRoc. Civ. 715, 717-22 (1990).
" For a similar statement, see Memmo, supra note 1, at 198.
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of the same products in the domestic sphere""6 did not exist any more. In
addition, it was asserted that the criteria used to establish whether a sale was
considered to be international, were unsatisfactory." However, considering
on the one hand the difficulties of agreeing upon a discipline that could also
be a substitute for the various national laws, i.e., the difficulties of creating
a uniformity also with reference to "internal" contracts, and, on the other
hand, the necessity of offering a uniform discipline that satisfies the
exigencies of international trade, the elaboration of a set of rules such as the
1980 Vienna Sales Convention has nevertheless been considered a great
accomplishment, even if limited to regulating only "international" sales. 8
V. THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETATION
Every convention which "does not constitute an exhaustive source of its
76 Bonell, supra note 40, at 9.
7 For this criticism, see Volken, supra note 65, at 26-29. The author states that
[t]he basic criterion, according to which a sale is considered international
if the parties to the contract have their places of business in different
States, is too broad, yet at the same time, too restrictive.
The criterion is too broad in the sense that it considers even those
sales as international in which the goods, from their fabrication to
consumption, have never left the original country... [if] the parties have
their place of business in different States....
On the other hand, the basic criterion is too restrictive in that it
excludes all sales from the Convention between two parties which import
or export goods but have their places of business in the same State.
Id. (emphasis in original).
78 For a similar conclusion, see Bonell, supra note 40, at 8, where it is stated that
[tjhe principal reason for which the Convention has been limited solely
to international transactions rests in the impossibility, at the present time,
of agreeing, with respect to sales contracts no less than to other commer-
cial contracts, on uniform rules intended to replace entirely the different
national laws .... At a universal level, the only realistic approach is that
of limiting the attempts at unification to international transactions, leaving
States free to continue regulating purely domestic relations according to
their own special needs.
See also FERRARI, supra note 68, at 18 (stating that even though the Vienna Sales
Convention's sphere of application is limited to international contracts, the Convention itself
must be considered a success).
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subject, but regulates only certain issues of it excluding others," '79 and
which "does not want to identify itself with any legal system, because it
wants to conjugate with all,"' can easily give rise to problems concerning
the precise meaning of its provisions and to problems concerning the
necessity of filling the gaps in which an incomplete discipline will inevitably
result. It seems evident that these issues may arise in relation to any
international convention, but they are most accentuated in the uniform sales
law as resulting from the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, since such issues
generally arise in proportion to the number of legal systems represented by
the various contracting States." l
Of course, interpretive problems can arise in relation to national legal
systems as well, 2 but such problems are much more prevalent when it
comes to the determination of the precise meaning of a law which, like the
1980 Vienna Sales Convention, has been drafted on an international level."3
VI. INTERPRETATION AND THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION:
GENERAL REMARKS
For a long time, there has been dispute on the interpretation of the
international conventions," a dispute which demonstrates a contrast
7 Giuseppe Benedetti, Art. 4, in CONvENZIONE DI VIENNA SUI CONTRATMI DI VENDITA
INTERNAZIONALE DI BENm MOBILI, supra note 40, at 9.
' Id. at 15.
s' For a similar affirmation, see BERNARD AUDrr, LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE
MARCHANDISES 47 (1990), where the author states that "the more often the convention must
be applied in ... countries representing different legal and political systems and different
economies, the higher is the risk" that it is necessary to determine the exact meaning of the
convention's provisions.
82 See Bonell, Art. 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note
40, at 65.
1 The reason for this can be found in that while in "applying domestic statutes, one can
rely on long established principles and criteria of interpretation to be found within each legal
system[,] [t]he situation is far more uncertain with respect to an instrument which, although
formally incorporated in the various national legal systems, has been prepared and agreed
upon at an international level." Id.
" The problems of differing interpretations of the same uniform law as well as the
reasons for such differences have been studied for a long time. There are multiple causes
which can give rise to diverging interpretations. In this regard, it has been pointed out that
some of the problems have their source in the uniform laws themselves, since generally there
are different official versions of the same uniform law, a circumstance which can by itself
give rise to interpretive doubts. For a reference to this reason, see, for example, Michael F.
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between the supporters of the thesis according to which "in virtue of national
proceedings, the conventions transform themselves into domestic law and
therefore their interpretation and integration must take place according to the
interpretive techniques ... of the domestic system in which they are
transplanted and will be applied,"8' and the supporters of the thesis that
international conventions must be interpreted "in an autonomous manner,"86
i.e., without making reference to the meaning one generally attributes to
certain expressions within the ambit of a determined system, because
otherwise the result would not only be a lack of uniformity, but also the
promotion of forum shopping. 7
While the 1964 Hague Conventions did not deal with the issue of
interpretation in a direct way,88 the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention dictates
a discipline which provides that the interpretation must occur with regard to
the international character of the convention and to the necessity of
Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in
Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 731 n.13 (1986) (stating that "textual
differences... undeniably impede uniformity").
There are, however, other reasons which can lead to diverging interpretations and which
are independent from the uniform law itself. In this regard it has been said that the
interpretive differences can also result from different national interests which the different
interpreters want to prevail over national interests of other States; see, e.g., Alejandro Garro,
Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 450 (1989) (asserting that "[t]he disparity of economic,
political, and legal structure of the countries represented at the Vienna Conference suggests
the difficulty of achieving legal uniformity").
85 Sergio Carbone, L'ambito di applicazione ed i criteri interpretativi della convenzione
di Vienna, in LA VENDrrA INTERNAZIONALE. LA CONVENZIONE DELL' 1 APRILE 1980 84
(1981).
" For a similar affirmation, see AUDrr, supra note 81, at 47; Michael J. Bonell, Art. 7,
in CONVENZIONE DI VIENNA SUI CONTRATrI DI VENDrrA INTERNAZIONALE DI BENI MOBIL!,
supra note 5, at 21.
87 The danger of forum shopping as a result of divergent interpretations has been also
pointed out by HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 142, where the author states that "[t]he settlement
of disputes would be complicated and litigants would be encouraged to engage in forum
shopping if the courts of different countries persist in divergent interpretations of the
Convention."
u In regard to the origins of Art. 7, it has been pointed out that it is not based upon any
provision of ULIS which did not expressly deal with the problem of interpretation; see, e.g.,
id. at 135 n.1, ("Paragraph (1) of Art. 7 is substantially the same as Art. 6 of the 1978 Draft
Convention. Paragraph (2) was added at the Diplomatic Conference.... ULIS has no
provision like paragraph (1).").
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promoting uniformity in its application and observance of good faith in
international commerce; 9 the Convention opted, in other words, for an
"autonomous interpretation"' , i.e., independent from the particular concepts
of a specific legal system. And this is true "[e]ven in the exceptional cases
where terms or concepts were employed which are peculiar to a given
national law,"'" such as "reasonable," "avoidance," and "dommages-
intr4ts.'"
Opting for the "autonomous" interpretation rather than for the "nationalis-
tic"92 interpretation which would have buried the convention does not
resolve, however, all the interpretive problems, since this choice is not one
of interpretive technique or method, but rather one of policy. 93 Indeed, Art.
7(1) of the Convention does not identify a method, but rather the goals of
the Convention (the most important of which is the promotion of uniformity
in which regard is to be had to the Convention's international character),
with which any interpretation must comply.
To have regard for the Convention's international character means that the
interpreter should not apply domestic law to solve interpretive problems,94
89 Article 7, which deals with the interpretation issue states:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law.
90 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
91 Bonell, supra note 82, at 74; Bonnell, supra note 86, at 21.
92 For this expression, see Michael J. Bonell, La nouvelle Convention des Nations-Unies
sur les contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, 7 DRorr r PRATIQUE DU
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 7, 14 (1981).
"3 For a similar evaluation of the rules contemplated in Art. 7 of the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention, see Gyula Etrsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 57,
at 2-5, where the author states that "the paragraph [7(1)] is necessarily vague and therefore
open to surprising results. Nevertheless, a considerable merit of the paragraph lies in the fact
that it proclaims an up-to-date policy in harmony with the exigencies of world trade which
postulates that no recourse to national law should be admitted in interpretation." (emphasis
added, footnote omitted).
" A similar affirmation can be found in HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 136 ("[Tihe reading
of a legal text in the light of the concepts of our domestic legal system[][is] an approach that
would violate the requirement that the Convention be interpreted with regard 'to its
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i.e., he should not read the Convention through the lenses of domestic
law,95 but should project the interpretive problems against an international
background."
From this rule it results, for example, that it is irrelevant whether the terms
or concepts employed in the Convention correspond to terms which within
a domestic legal system have a determined meaning,' since the expressions
employed in the Convention were intended to be neutral. 98 Furthermore,
one must not forget that the choice of one term rather than another is the
result of a compromise?9 and does not necessarily correspond to the
international character.' " (emphasis in original).
Similar statements can be found in a recent decision of the English House of Lords; see
Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, [1980] 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L.), [1980] W.L.R. 209.
" See, for the danger growing out of reading the Convention through the lenses of
domestic law, John 0. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International
Words: Uniform Application?, J.L. & CoM. 208 (1988), where the author states that "one
threat to international uniformity in interpretation is a natural tendency to read the
international text through the lenses of domestic law."
" See also HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 136 ("To read the words of the Convention with
regard for their 'international character' requires that they be projected against an international
background.").
" For similar conclusions, see, for example, ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA,
INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT. KOMMENTAR ZU DEM OBEREINKOMMEN DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN VOM 11. APRIL 1980 OBER VERTRAGE OBER DEN INTERNATnONLEN WARENKAUF
47 (1991); PILrz, supra note 51, at 66.
For somewhat different conclusions, see, however, F.J.A. van der Velden, Indications of
the Interpretation by Dutch Courts of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 1980, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE TWELFTH INTERNATION-
AL CONGRESS OF COMPARATivE LAW: SIDNEY-MELBoURNE 1986 21, 33-34 (Hondius et al.
eds., 1987) (stating that where a source of uniform law is a specific provision of national law,
recourse to its domestic interpretation is a logical aid to interpretation of the uniform law);
F. A. Mann, Uniform Statutes in English Law, 99 L. Q. REv. 376, 383 (1983) (stating that
"[ilt is simply common sense that if the Convention adopts a phrase which appears to have
been taken from one legal system ... where it is used in a specific sense, the international
legislators are likely to have had that sense in mind and to intend its introduction into the
Convention").
" The neutrality of the language employed has also been pointed out by Bonell, supra
note 82, at 74 ("When drafting the single provisions these experts had to find sufficiently
neutral language on which they could reach a common understanding."). A similar statement
can a be found in HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 136.
" It has been said that as far as the Convention is concerned, one can distinguish different
kind of compromises. They have been classified as follows: "(1) those that are clear and
recognizable; (2) those that are detectable only by initiates with access to Conference
1994]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
reception of a concept peculiar to specific domestic law: 1°° the interpreter
has to be aware of so-called faux-amis.1°1
From the general rule according to which in the interpretation of the
Convention regard is to be had to its international character, it results above
all that the interpreters"°2 cannot make recourse to interpretive techniques
employed under domestic law' °3 as this would lead to results contrary to
those desired. In that regard, it suffices to give one example: in most
common law countries statutes are generally interpreted restrictively,"
consequently, "by doing so, the provisions of the statutory law become
framed within the principles of the judge made law."" However,
[clontrary to ordinary domestic legislation, which courts may
still consider an infringement of 'their' case law, the
Convention, once adopted, is intended to replace all the rules
in their legal systems previously governing matters within its
scope, whether deriving from statutes or from the case law.
This means that in applying the Convention there is no valid
reason to adopt a narrow interpretation."
documents; (3) those entered with mental reservations on each side, each side keeping its own
view of what was agreed; and (4) those masking continuing disagreement and hence merely
illusory." Garro, supra note 84, at 452 (summarizing a classification conceived by Gyula
E6rsi, Comment, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International
Sales of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 346, 353-356).
'm See also FRrIz ENDERLEIN Er AL., INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 61 (1991); Herber,
Art. 7, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EIHErrLICHEN UN-KAuFRECHT 89 (Peter Schlechtriem ed.,
1990).
101 For this expression, see HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 136.
'e The interpreters are not only judges but the contracting parties as well; see, for a
similar affirmation, FRITz ENDERLEIN & DER MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 55
(1992), where the authors state that "[tlo have regard to the international character of the
Convention means, above all, not to proceed in interpreting it from national juridical
constructions and terms .... This does not only refer to judges but also to the parties which
in settling their differences of opinion first and foremost have to interpret the applicable
rules."
10" This point has been stressed by Bonell, supra note 82, at 72 (affirming that "[t]o have
regard to the 'international character' of the Convention means first of all to avoid relying on
the rules and techniques traditionally followed in interpreting ordinary domestic legislation").
104 See, for a similar affirmation, AUDrr, supra note 81, at 47 n.2.
'" Francesco Galgano, Civil law e common law. Generalita, in ATLANTE DI DIRrrro
PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra note 13, at 1.
106 Bonell, supra note 82, at 73.
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VII. THE PROMOTION OF THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND FOREIGN CASE LAW
The goal set down in Art. 7(1)--to reach the broadest degree of uniformity
in the application of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, which has been said
to be the supreme goal of the Convention°--is strictly linked to its
interpretation in which regard is to be had to its international character.
Indeed, it is undeniable that the "autonomous" interpretation of the uniform
law itself promotes, up to a certain point, the uniformity of its applica-
tion."° In fact, as far as uniform application is concerned, the "nationalis-
tic" interpretation of the Convention would only entail consequences that
certainly are contrary to the goals intended to be achieved by the elaboration
of a uniform law."°
101 For this definition, see Cook, supra note 65, at 216.
If it is true that "autonomous" interpretation influences (rectius: promotes) uniformity
in the application of the Convention, it is also true that the exigency of promoting its uniform
application had some influence on the choice of "autonomous" interpretation rather than
"nationalistic" interpretation.
For a similar conclusion, see Bonell, supra note 82, at 74-75, where the author states
[a]nother and more important reason for the autonomous interpretation of
the Convention relates to the Convention's ultimate aim, which is to
achieve world-wide uniformity in the law of international sale contracts.
To this end it is not sufficient to have the Convention adopted by the
single States. It is equally important that its provisions will be interpreted
in the same way in various countries. This result would be seriously
jeopardized if those called on to apply the Convention would resort, in
case of ambiguities or obscurities in the text, to principles and criteria
taken from a particular domestic law.
'09 For the consequences and the reasons of "nationalistic" interpretation, see Sturley,
supra note 84, at 733, where the author states
independent domestic legal concerns push national courts into differing
interpretations of supposedly uniform laws. Each court considers itself
bound to interpret and apply international uniform law in a manner that
will avoid inconsistency or tension with its own domestic law. Con-
strained by substantively different domestic laws, national courts allow
their desire to minimize the disruptive effects of international [uniform]
law to overwhelm their mandate to maintain uniformity. Diverging
interpretations of the international [uniform] law are the result.
For a similar statement, see also Michael J. Bonell, International Uniform Law in
Practice-Or Where the Real Trouble Begins, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 865, 879 (1990).
The negative consequences of a "nationalistic" interpretation have been pointed out by
courts as well. See, for example, the British House of Lords decision Scruttons Ltd. v.
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However, to succeed in the uniform application of the Vienna Sales
Convention, as in any convention of uniform law, it does not suffice that the
Convention is considered an autonomous body of rules, since it still can be
interpreted in diverse ways in various systems." ° This can occur, for
example, when the convention itself can give rise to different autonomous
interpretations. In this case, the uniformity of the result would be a very
unlikely coincidence. Where, for instance, there are three equally plausible
autonomous interpretations and two interpreters who construe the same
provision independently, the chance that there will be a uniform result
amounts only to 33%, or, in other words, the probability of diverging
interpretations is 67%."'
From what has been said, it results that uniformity can only be attained if
the interpreter in interpreting the provisions has regard to the practice of the
other contracting States." 2  The interpreter must consider "what others
have already done,"'" 3 i.e., he must consider the decisions rendered by
Midland Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446, 471, where it is stated that "it would be deplorable
if the nations should, after protracted negotiations, reach agreement... and that their several
courts should then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree upon."
110 For a similar conclusion, see R.J.C. Munday, Comment, The Uniform Interpretation
of International Conventions, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 450 (1978), where it is stated that
"[the principal objective of an international convention is to achieve uniformity of legal rules
within the various States party to it. However, even when outward uniformity is achieved
following the adoption of a single authoritative text, uniform application of the agreed rules
is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost inevitably come to put
different interpretations upon the same enacted words."
. For similar conclusions, see Sturley, supra note 84, at 738, where the author states that
"[s]ome commentators suggest more directly that international conflicts
in interpretation are random occurrences. The idea is simply that, when
so many national courts construe uniform laws, a form of judicial
centrifugal force makes diverging interpretations inevitable. The logic of
this theory is apparent, for a simple numerical example can illustrate the
potential impact of random distribution. Suppose a uniform law provision
has five equally plausible interpretations. The first court to construe it
will adopt one of them. If a foreign court independently construes the
same provision, there is only a 20% chance it will adopt the same
interpretation. Thus there is an 80% chance that a conflict will develop."
(footnotes omitted).
212 Similar affirmations can be found in Herber, supra note 100, at 89.
"' Dieter Maskow, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the
Perspective of the Socialist Countries, in LA VENDrrA INTERNAZIONALE, supra note 85, at
54.
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judicial bodies of other contracting States, since it is possible that the same
or analogous question has already been examined by other States' courts,114
in which case such decisions can have either the value of prece-
dent" 5 -"[i]f there is already a body of international case law, 11 6 or a
persuasive value.
117
There is no doubt that in practice taking foreign decisions into ac-
count-independently from whether one attributes persuasive or binding
authority to them-can generate difficulties, both because of the difficulties
in finding foreign decisions and because of the language barrier. And it was
to obviate this problem that, after rejecting the idea of creating an interna-
tional tribunal to make rulings on such cases, 1 UNCITRAL, in its twenty-
"4 For the necessity of having regard to other countries' decisions, see, for example,
HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 97, at 48; ALBERT H. KRrrZER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATION-
AL SALE OF GOODS 109 (1989); Cook, supra note 65, at 199; PILTZ, supra note 51, at 66.
115 However, with regard to common law, there is dispute among scholars and courts as
to whether decisions rendered by foreign courts have persuasive or binding authority; see, for
a discussion of this problem, Cook, supra note 65, at 218-20.
16 Bonell, supra note 82, at 91.
117 As for a reference to the persuasive power of foreign court decisions, see also
ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 56, where the authors state that "[w]hat matters
... is not a prejudicial effect of rulings by foreign courts or arbitrational tribunals and not
that the decision taken by an organ, which by accident was entrusted first to deal with a
specific legal issue, is attached a particularly great importance; rather, the existing material
in regard to relevant rulings has to be taken account of when giving the reasons for a
decision."
18 This issue arose under the 1964 Hague Conventions as well; see, for example,
Graveson, supra note 22, at 12, where the author states that "[a]llowing for the necessary and
inevitable divergence of human decision, a problem still remains of ensuring that any
tendencies towards divergence in the application of uniform laws shall be corrected at
appropriate times and in suitable ways. How then shall continuing uniformity be ensured?
Shall it be done by giving ultimate jurisdiction to an- international court, such as the
International Court of Justice?" (emphasis added).
However,
a similar solution can hardly be conceived with respect to the present
Convention. This Convention, like other international conventions
elaborated under the auspices of the United Nations or other international
organizations ... is intended to receive a world-wide acceptance. To
expect that all adhering States, notwithstanding their different social,
political and legal structure, could even agree on conferring to an
international tribunal the exclusive competence to resolve divergencies
between the national jurisdictions in the interpretations of the uniform
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first working session (1988),119 decided to adopt a procedure in which the
decisions rendered in the application of the uniform law in the various
Contracting States are all gathered by so-called national correspondents who
then "send to the UNCITRAL Secretariat the full text of the decisions in
their original languages; the Secretariat will make these decisions accessible
to any interested person,""n among others, by preparing abstracts of them
and by translating them into the various official languages of the United
Nations and by distributing them to all the contracting States which then will
have to publish them."' This procedure undoubtedly will promote the
uniform application of the Vienna Sales Convention. However, since this
procedure presupposes the existence of decisions, it will bring practical
results only with the passage of time, i.e., after decisions have been
rendered."n
VIII. INTERPRETATION OF THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND SCHOLARLY WRITINGS
However, there are other "antidotes '' "a to the danger of differing
interpretations of uniform law. Another useful guide is the procedure that
resulted in the drafting of the definitive text of the Convention, in other
words, the study of the travaux priparatoires."" It must be noted,
however, that recourse to such materials must not be overestimated in
rules, would be entirely unrealistic.
Bonell, supra note 82, at 89.
119 See REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
ON THE WoRK OF ITS TWENTY-FIRST SESsION 98 (1988).
12 HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 145.
1 For a reference to this procedure, see also Bonell, supra note 109, at 878; HERBER &
CZERWENKA, supra note 97, at 48.
122 Even though the Vienna Sales Convention came into force only on January 1, 1988,
one can already find decisions. For an overview of early decisions, see Burghard Piltz, Neue
Entwicklungen im UN-Kaufrecht, NEuE JuRIsTIsCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1101 (1994); Gert
Reinhart, Zum Inkrafttreten des UN-Kaufrechts fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Erste
Entscheidungen deutscher Gerichte, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHR-
ENSRECHTS 289 (1990).
13 This expression can be found in Honnold, supra note 95, at 208.
12 Among civil law commentators, it is common teaching that in interpreting uniform law
one must take into account legislative history; see, for instance, AuDrr, supra note 81, at 48;
ENDERLEIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 61; HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 97, at 49;
MARTIN KAROLLUS, UN-KAuFRECHT 11 (1991); PILTZ, supra note 51, at 67.
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interpreting the Vienna Sales Convention (or any other convention).' Not
only because once adopted, "the Convention, like any other law, has its own
life,""12 but also because not all countries' rules on treaty interpretation are
the same."2 In fact, while in civil law countries the possibility of resolv-
ing an interpretive problem by making reference to the legislative history has
never been doubted,' 28 problems are posed in certain common law coun-
tries, where one has to "face a conflict over the legitimacy of legislative
history. ''129
In the United States, the possibility of referring to the legislative history
has long been admitted.13° Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court of
the United States confirmed that treaties "[may be] construed more liberally
than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond
the written words to the history of the treaty."
13
'
In England, by contrast, not unlike in other common law countries, the
meaning of any provision must generally be inferred solely from the words
of the statute, according to the so-called "literal rule," at least as far as
domestic legislation is concerned. 3 2  With reference to the interpretation
' A similar conclusion can be found in HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 141-42.
6 Bonell, supra note 86, at 22.
'7 For a similar statement, see Sturley, supra note 84, at 740 (pointing out that some
authors argue that "conflicts arise through differences in the methodology of treaty
interpretation").
" For similar statement see, above all, John 0. Honnold, Uniform Words and Uniform
Application. The 1980 Sales Convention and International Juridical Practice, in EINHErrLI-
CHES KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, supra note 42, at 133, where the
author summarizes the various reports to the Twelfth International Congress of Comparative
Law (Australia, 1986) and states that "frieporters from jurisdictions primarily of civil law
background report free use of travauxpreparatoires even in construing domestic legislation."
'29 HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 138.
30 For similar affirmations made by civil law scholars, see, for example, Otto Riese,
Einheitliches Gerichtsbarkeit fir vereinheitlichtes Recht?, 26 RABELs ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AusLANDIscims UND INTERNATIONALES RECHT 604, 609 (1961); Wahl, Art. 17, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT, supra note 48, at 129.
"' Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985). For a reference to this case in scholarly
writing, see HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 138.
132 For similar statements, see, for instance, KEITH J. EDDEY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 121 (4th ed., 1987) (stating that "[t]he first principle [in interpreting statutes] is that
the judge should apply the words according to their 'ordinary, plain and natural meaning.'
This is known as the literal rule, the application of 'litera legis.' "); KENNETH SMITH and
DENIS KEENAN, ENGLISH LAW 11 (5th ed., 1975) (affirming that "[a]ccording to this rule
[the literal rule), the working of the Act must be construed according to its literal and
19941
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of international conventions one must point out that the rigidity of the literal
rule-that for a long time excluded recourse to the legislative his-
tory'P33-has recently been eased not only in England, but also in other
common law countries."34 To that end it is sufficient to recall the English
case of Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, 35 where four of five judges of the
House of Lords made reference to the legislative history in order to interpret
a provision of an international convention. 36
There are other means which, when used properly, can neutralize the
danger of differing interpretations of a uniform law. One of those is the
recourse to doctrine 37 which seems to be nearly unlimited as far as the
Vienna Sales Convention is concerned. 38  In civil law, one has always
made recourse to doctrine as an instrument for interpretation. 39 And
recourse to scholarly writing seems to have become more and more common
grammatical meaning whatever the result may be."); PHILIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LAW 10 (12th ed., 1989) (pointing out that "[t]he cardinal rule is that the words of
an enactment must prima facie be interpreted in their ordinary, literal or grammatical sense.
And provided that so to interpret them does not give rise to some absurdity, repugnancy,
inconsistency or ambiguity the court is not entitled to construe them loosely or fancifully,
even if a strict construction appears to it to lead to a wrong result.") (emphasis in original).
133 For a similar statement made with reference to English law, see Volken, supra note
65, at 39-40, where the author states that "[i]t is common knowledge that common law judges
seem traditionally less willing to take recourse to preparatory materials or to refer to the
genesis of a statute and its rules," since" '[the meaning of legislation must be deduced solely
from the word of the statute.' " (endnote omitted; emphasis in original).
34 A similar conclusion can be found in Honnold, supra note 128, at 131, where the
author refers to Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
135 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, [1980] 2 All E.R. 696 (H.L.) (The departure from the
literal rule was justified on the ground that "the language ... has not been chosen by an
English draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English legislative idiom nor
designed to be construed exclusively by English judges.").
336 For a more detailed examination of this decision concerning the interpretation of an
Act of Parliament which gave effect to the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (amended at the
Hague in 1955) on the Liability for Carriage of Goods by Air, see HONNOLD, supra note 59,
at 138-41.
137 As for a recent definition of doctrine, see 4 GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 164 (1984).
13 For bibliographies concerning the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, see, for example,
MICHAEL J. WILL, INTERNATIONALE BIBLIOGRAPHiE ZUM UN-KAUFRE CHT (2nd ed., 1989);
Peter Winship, A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations International Sales
Convention, 21 INT'L LAW. 585 (1987); Peter Winship, The UN Sales Convention: A
Bibliography of English-Language Publications, 28 INT'L LAW. 401 (1994).
139 See HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 144.
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in common law countries, such as in England"4 and America, 4' where
judges have been historically reluctant to make recourse to scholarly
writing.' 42
It is, on the contrary, doubtful whether the study of comparative law can
be useful for the uniform application of uniform law. 43 In that regard one
must agree with those scholars who affirm that both the study and the
comparison of concepts belonging to different legal systems could result in
consequences contrary to those the 1980 Uniform Sales Law intended to
achieve. Indeed, through such study one increases the risk of diverging
interpretations of the expressions employed in the Convention-which the
draftsmen intended to be free from any legal connotation.'" Recourse to
the study of the concepts of foreign law should, however, be admissible
when either the legislative history or the Convention itself lead to the
conclusion that the drafters referred to concepts peculiar to a specific
domestic legal system. 45
'40 For a reference to the departure from the refusal to make recourse to doctrine by
English judges, see Honnold, supra note 128, at 126, where the author states that "in the
United Kingdom, the former practice against citation of living authors has been relaxed....
[C]ourts resort to writers if there is no judicial statement on the point or (a point significant
for our topic) in considering decisions of foreign courts in a foreign tongue."
'"" In reference to the United States it has been pointed out by Honnold, supra note 95,
at 208, that "[tiraditional barriers to the use of scholarly writing in legal development broke
down a long time ago in this country and is breaking down in citadels of literalism in other
parts of the common law world, especially in the handling of international legal materials."
142 See Edgar Bodenheimer, Doctrine as a Source of the International Unification of Law,
34 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supplement) 67 (1986), where the author examines in detail from a
comparative point of view the question "whether doctrinal writings may be considered
primary authorities of law on a par with legislation and (in some legal systems) court
decisions, or whether they must be relegated to the status of secondary sources." Id. at 71.
141 The possibility of employing comparative law methods in order to promote the uniform
application of uniform law has been rejected for example by ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra
note 102, at 60 (stating that "[t]he wording of the Convention does in no way support the
application of this method"); for a similar conclusion, see also HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra
note 97, at 49.
Bonell, supra note 82, at 81, seems, however, to take a different point of view.
'" A similar statement can be found in HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 136, where it is
stated that "[t]he ideal [was] to use plain language that refers to things and events for which
there are words of common content in the various languages."
145 The same conclusion can be found in Herber, supra note 100, at 92, where the author
states that "the meaning within a domestic system is relevant only when it could be
recognized by the participants of the Conference."
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DC. GOOD FAITH AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MERE INTERPRETATION
According to Art. 7(1) of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, in interpret-
ing its provisions one must have regard not only to the necessity of
promoting the Convention's uniform application, but also to the need of
promoting the observance of good faith in international trade. This provision
represents a compromise between the views of those representatives "who
would have preferred a provision imposing directly on the parties the duty
to act in good faith, and those who on the contrary were opposed to any
explicit reference to the principle of good faith in the Convention."" The
question that one has to raise is how does one interpret the result of the
compromise: is good faith relevant only with reference to the interpretation
of the Convention or is it also relevant as far as the parties' behavior is
concerned? 47
According to some authors, good faith is relevant solely as an additional
tool of interpretation to which judges must make recourse and which must
be employed by them to neutralize the danger of reaching inequitable
results.' One must note, however, that even if conceived as a mere
instrument of interpretation, good faith may pose some problems and conflict
with the "ultimate" goal of the Convention, i.e., the promotion of its uniform
" Bonell, supra note 82, at 83-84.
For similar affirmations, see also HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 146, according to whom Art.
7(1) "was adopted as a compromise between two divergent views: (a) Some delegates
supported a general rule that, at least in the formation of the contract, the parties must observe
principles of 'fair dealing' and must act in 'good faith'; (b) Others resisted this step on the
ground that 'fair dealing' and 'good faith' had no fixed meaning and would lead to
uncertainty."
"4 The opposition to the introduction of a "good faith provision" had also been raised in
the occasion of the 1964 Hague Conference; see, for example, Garro, supra note 84, at 466,
where the author recalls that "as early as the Hague Diplomatic Conference in 1964, explicit
reference to good faith as a general principle was opposed by the French delegate[][who]
asserted that the principle of good faith might lead to divergent and even arbitrary
interpretations by national courts, and thus would impair uniformity."
'" For a concern expressed in regard to the results to which a "good faith provision" may
lead, see E. Allan Farnsworth, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the
Perspective of the Common Law Countries, in LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE, supra note 85,
at 18, where the author draws his attention to the disadvantages of a provision of the
aforementioned kind and states that "the terms 'good faith' and 'fair dealing' are vague that
their meaning cannot help but vary widely from one legal system to another. Their use on
operative provisions phrased in the laconic drafting style of the CISG would surely lead to
confusion and non-conformity."
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application. In fact, because the concept of good faith is very vague, 49
"courts will be unable to develop a common definition,"' which is true
even as far as domestic law is concerned.' This will inevitably lead to
differing interpretations of the Convention's uniform provisions.5 2  This
danger appears very clearly if one considers the variety of good faith
definitions one can find in a comparative setting.' To that purpose it
suffices to remember that in the United States, where, by virtue of the
influence of civil law teachings"M , the principle of good faith was adopted
by both the Uniform Commercial Code' 55 and the Restatement (Second)
',
9 The vagueness of the concept of good faith has been criticized, for instance, by Arthur
Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L. J. 265, 289, where the author also points out "the
multiple meanings of good faith and the differing connotations the doctrine possesses in
different legal systems" (footnote omitted).
150 Dore & Defranco, supra note 52, at 63. For a similar conclusion, see also Gyula
E6rsi, Problems of Unified Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 314 (1979).
151 In America, for instance, the good faith principle has been employed by the courts in
order to prevent one party from exercising discretion in a way incompatible with the purpose
of the contract. For courts' decisions regarding the use of discretionary power and good faith,
see R. A. Weaver & Assoc., Inc. v. Aspalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Homestake Mining Co. v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 476 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979).
However, the good faith principle has also been employed to "avoid inequitable results
caused by an overly literal application of a statute or contract provision. Moreover, courts
have used the provision to prevent a party from taking advantage of his own actions taken
in bad faith." Dore & Defranco, supra note 52, at 62 (footnotes omitted).
152 Regarding this risk, see Note, supra note 45, at 89, where it is stated that "the
vagueness of a good faith provision may create problems for courts trying to decide when and
how to apply it; in addition, overuse or underuse of the principle may lead to inconsistent
results or to outright abuse."
15 For a comparative overview on good faith, see, for example, R. Newman, The General
Principles of Equity, in EQUrrY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIvE STUDY
589 (R. Newman ed., 1973).
" For a similar statement, see HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 147, where the author states
that the "general requirements of 'good faith' is not [sic] typical of common-law statutory
drafting; [it] reveals the unstated influence of some of the civil law codes."
' See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). For a detailed discussion of
the good faith provision in the U.C.C., see Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1981); E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the
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of Contracts, 156 its area of operation is limited to the performance of the
contract. 157 In civil law systems, as well as in socialist systems,' on the
contrary, there is not only a "common law duty to perform in good
faith," '59 but the good faith principle operates also with regard to the
interpretation and the formation of contracts. 160 However, "even where...
the principle as such is expressly stated with respect not only to performance
but also to formation and interpretation of the contract ... its specific
applications in practice may differ considerably."' 6  In that regard it is
sufficient to recall the importance of the good faith principle set down in §
242 of the German Civil Code' 62 and the effect it had on the elaboration
of such principles as the culpa in contrahendo163 and the positive Forder-
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 666 (1963); Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
'- See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
'S" See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 148, at 18 ("IT]he American rules on good faith go
to the performance of the contract.").
'5 For a comparative discussion of good faith in the bargaining and formation process,
see, for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments-Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); Friedrich
Kessler and Edith Fine, Culpa In Contrahendo, Bargaining In Good Faith, And Freedom Of
Contract, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401 (1964); Roif Nirk, Rechtsvergleichendes zur Haftung fur
culpa in contrahendo, 18 RABELS ZErrscHRIFr FOR AusLkNDIscHEs UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 310 (1953).
5 For this expression, see Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law
Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980).
260 See Rosett, supra note 149, at 290 ("In continental and socialist systems the concept
[of good faith] may have broader connotations. In particular, the notion of good faith is not
limited to the performance of completed agreements, but extends to the process of formation.
It operates as a limit on the right of a party to terminate the formation process.").
'6' Bonell, supra note 82, at 85-86.
"6 See § 242, German Civil Code [hereinafter BGB]: "The debtor is bound to effect
performance according to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration to common
usage."
263 For a discussion of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine in Germany based on Ihering's
teachings (see Rudolf heting, Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen oder
nicht zur Perfetkion gelangten Vertragen, 4 IHERINGS JAHRBOCHER 1 (1861)), see Gottwald,
Die Haftung fir culpa in contrahendo, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 877 (1982); Karl Larenz,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Verkehrssicherungspflicht und "sozialer Kontak," MONATSSCHRIFr
FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 515 (1954); Rolf Nirk, Culpa in Contrahendo-Eine geglilckte
richterliche Rechtsfortbildung-Quo Vadis?, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR PHILIPP MAHRING 71
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ungsverletzung.'"
X. GOOD FAITH IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
While some authors, as mentioned, hold that good faith operates solely as
an instrument of interpretation of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, other
authors affirm that the reference to the necessity of promoting the observance
of good faith in international trade65 (Art. 7(1)) is "also necessarily
directed to the parties to each individual contract of sale,"66 despite the
reference to good faith being incorporated in the provision dedicated to the
interpretation of the Convention. 67 In support of this thesis according to
which good faith can also be considered as being one of the "general
principles" on which the Uniform Sales Law is based," it is sufficient to
recall that there are several provisions which represent a particular applica-
(Hefermehl et al. eds., 1975); Hans Stoll, Tatbestdnde und Funktionen der Haftungfilir culpa
in contrahendo, in FESTSTCHRIFr FOR ERNST VON CAEMMERER 435 (Ficker ed., 1978).
164 Several articles have been written on the positive Vertragsverletzung and its relation
to the culpa in contrahendo doctrine and good faith; see, e.g., Gerhardt, Der Haftungsmaflstab
im gesetzlichen Schuldverh.iltnis (Positive Vertragsverletzung, culpa in contrahendo),
JuRisTIscHE ScHuLuNO 597 (1970); Picker, Positive Forderungsverletzung und culpa in
contrahendo, 183 ARCHiv FOR DIE CIVILIsTISCHE PRAXIs 369 (1983).
165 As far as the notion "good faith in international trade" is concerned, it has been
pointed out that the reference to international trade prevents national courts from being
allowed to draw on domestic conceptions of good faith; but see Note, Unification and
Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1991 (1984), where the contrary has been stated: "In applying the
[good faith) rule, national courts remain free to draw on domestic-and hence di-
verse-conceptions of 'good faith'."
166 Bonell, supra note 82, at 84; see, for similar statements, PETER SCHLECHTRIEM,
UNIFORM LAW OF SALES-THE U.N.-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS 39 (1986); PETER SCHLECHTRiEM, ErNHEITLICHES UN-KAuFRECHT 25
(1981).
" See, for a similar statement, E6rsi, supra note 93, at 2-8 ("[T]he good faith clause may
play an active role in spite of its location in the Convention."). The same has been said by
Ulrich Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf eines Obereinkommensfiir internationale Warenkauf-
vertrage, 43 RABEIS ZErTSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
413, 432 (1979); Laszlo R6czei, The Rules of the Convention Relating to its Field of
Application and to its Interpretation, in PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW 86 (1980).
168 This has also been asserted by Herber, supra noti 100, at 93.
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tion of the aforementioned principle,"6 such as Art. 16(2)(b).' 70 In fact,
it is undeniable that the aforementioned provision is grounded on the
principle of good faith to the extent that it provides that a proposal is
irrevocable where it was reasonable for the offeree to rely upon the offer
being held open and the offeree acted in reliance on the offer.
17
'
Those who argue in favor of a similar notion of good faith, i.e., good faith
as one of the general principles of the convention rather than an instrument
of mere interpretation, 72 risk, however, being driven to the conclusion that
"[a]s such it may even impose on the parties additional obligations of a
positive character,' 7  such as acting in good faith in the bargaining and
" Similar statements can be found in AUDIT, supra note 81, at 49; HONNOLD, supra note
59, at 147; KRITZER, supra note 114, at 111.
170 Art. 16(2)(b) provides, in pertinent part, "(2) [A]n offer cannot be revoked: ... (b)
if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree
has acted in reliance on the offer."
.. For a list of further applications of the good faith principle in particular provisions of
the Convention, see OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS. VIENNA, 10 MARCH - 11 APRIL 1980
18 (1981), where it is stated that "[a]mong the manifestations of the requirement of the
observance of good faith are the rules contained in the following articles:
- article 19(2) [which became final art. 21(2)] on the status of a late acceptance
which was sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it
would have reached the offeror in due time;
- article 27(2) [which became final art. 29(2)] in relation to the preclusion of a party
from relying on a provision in a contract that modification or abrogation of the
contract must be in writing;
- article 35 and 44 [which became final articles 37 and 48] on the rights of a seller
to remedy non-conformities in the goods;
- article 38 [which became final art. 40] which precludes the seller from relying on
the fact that notice of non-conformity has not been given by the buyer in
accordance with articles 36 and 37 [which became final articles 38 and 39] if the
lack of conformity relates to facts of which the seller knew or could not have been
unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer;
- articles 45(2), 60(2) and 67 [which became final articles 49(2), 64(2) and 82] on
the loss of the right to declare the contract avoided;
- articles 74 and 77 [which became final articles 85 and 88] which impose on the
parties obligations to take steps to preserve the goods."
17 A similar notion seems to be supported, for instance, by Dore & Defranco, supra note
52, at 61, where the authors state that the good faith provision does not constitute a mere
instrument of interpretation, but rather, it "appears to be a pervasive norm analogous to the
good faith obligation of the U.C.C."
17 Bonell, supra note 82, at 85.
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formation process. 74
The aforementioned possibility of imposing on the parties additional
obligations must not be admitted. However, this does not mean that one
should adopt the view according to which good faith represents merely an
instrument of interpretation. On the contrary, the parties' behavior must be
measured on a good faith standard, 175 limited by the Convention's scope
of application ratione materiae.
17 6
XI. ARTICLE 7(2) AND GAPS PRAETER LEGEM
Notwithstanding "[o]ne of the reasons for enacting the Convention is to
provide a uniform body of law in the event the parties fail to consider, or
agree on, the applicable body of law,"'" the Convention does not "consti-
tute an exhaustive body of rules,' 7 8 i.e., it does not provide solutions for
all the problems which can originate from an international sale. Indeed, the
issues governed by the 1980 Uniform Sales Law are limited to the formation
of the contract and the rights and obligations of the parties resulting from
174 The view that Art. 7(1) imposes on the parties the duty of good faith bargaining has
been taken, for instance, by Pedro Silva-Ruiz, Some Remarks about the 1980 Vienna
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-Emphasis on Puerto Rico, 4
ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 141 (1987), where the author states that "Article 7 makes
good faith applicable not only to the performance and enforcement of contracts but also to
their formation" and (by referring to Gert Reinhart, Development of the Law for the
International Sale of Goods, 14 CuMB. L. REV. 89, 100 (1983)) that the culpa in contrahendo
principle "may be incorporated into the Convention by the court even though not expressly
adopted by the Convention."
Contra, in the sense that they expressly deny the existence of a duty of good faith
bargaining imposed on the parties by virtue of Article 7, Monique Jametti Greiner, Der
Vertragsabschlufl, in DAS EINHEITLICHE WIENER KAUFRECHT 46 (Hans Hoyer and Willibald
Posch eds., 1992); Herber, supra note 100, at 74.
'7 Maskow, supra note 113, at 55, seems to reach the same conclusion by stating that
"the most objective criterion for what the principle of goof faith in international trade means
is the Convention itself."
'76 For an overview on the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention's scope of application ratione
materiae, see, above all, Giorgio De Nova, L'ambito di applicazione "ratione materiae" delta
convenzione di Vienna, 44 Riv. TRIM. Drt. PROC. Civ. 749 (1990); Franco Ferrari, L'ambito
de applicazione della convenzione di Vienna sulla vendita internazionale, 48 RIv. TRIM. DIR.
PRoc. Civ. 893 (1994).
177 KRrTZER, supra note 114, at 31.
17n Benedetti, supra note 79, at 9.
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such a contract. 79 Surely this limitation will give rise to problems relating
to the necessity of filling gaps in which any type of incomplete body of rules
will result.'80 It is to comply with such necessity that the 1980 Vienna
Sales Convention provides that "[q]uestions concerning matters governed by
this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence
of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.' 81
The aim of this provision is not very different from that which the
interpretation rules are pursuing,' i.e., uniformity in the Convention's
application. Since this is the ultimate goal, "[iln accordance with the basic
criteria established in paragraph (1), first part, for the interpretation of the
Convention in general, not only in the case of ambiguities or obscurities in
the text, but also in the case of gaps, courts should to the largest possible
'7 See CISG Art. 4:
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a
contract. In particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Convention, it is not concerned with:
(a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any
usage;
(b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the
goods sold.
,"o One must note that the possible existence of gaps does not only characterize
international conventions, such as the one de quo; indeed, as has been pointed out by Jaubert,
Report Dion 30 vent6se An XII to the Legislative Body, in RECEUIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX
PR ARATOMES DU CODE CrvrL (P. Fenet ed., 1827), it is impossible to foresee everything,
"especially in the field of contract, as contracts have infinite variety; it is even dangerous to
descend into particulars." (quoted and translated in ARTHUR VON MEHREN & JAMES
GORDLEY, THE CIVI LAW SYsTEM 55 (2nd ed., 1977)).
18 CISG Art. 7 (2). For a justification of the existence of such a rule, see Edrsi, supra
note 93, at 2-11, where it is stated that "the justification for such a provision can be derived
from the fact that it is hardly possible for an international group to draft a voluminous and
complicated piece of legislation without leaving gaps behind."
1 For a discussion of the relationship between Art. 7(1) on interpretation and Art. 7(2)
on gap filling, see E6rsi, supra note 93, at 2-9, where the author, after having discussed Art.
7(1), states "[als a transition to Article 7(2), it might be mentioned that gaps in the law
constitute a danger in respect of interpretation of the Convention, since one way to follow the
homeward trend is to find gaps in the law. On the other hand, if a gap is detected, the
problem arising thereby should be solved by way of interpretation of the Convention. This
must be the means whereby gaps are filled."
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extent refrain from resorting to the different domestic laws and try to find
a solution within the Convention itself." ' 3
However, before discussing the meaning of the rule that questions
concerning matters governed by the Vienna Sales Convention which are not
expressly settled in it have to be settled "in conformity with its general
principles," one must identify the matters to which that rule applies.
It has to be pointed out from the very beginning that the gaps to which the
rule refers are not the gaps intra legem, i.e., the matters that are excluded
from the scope of application of the Convention, such as the matters
contemplated in Articles 4'"' and 518 of the Convention, but the gaps
praeter legem,1" i.e., issues to which the Convention applies but which it
does not expressly resolve.1"
To fill similar gaps (praeter legem), i.e., similar "open texture border-
lines"1  in international conventions as well as in domestic law, three
183 Bonell, supra note 82, at 75.
184 For the text of Art. 4, see supra note 179.
385 It is common understanding that Art. 5 (stating "[tihis Convention does not apply to
the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person")
excludes product liability from coverage by the 1980 Uniform Sales Law; see, for a similar
view, at least as far as "damage claims for death or personal injury caused by the goods" [are
concerned], Peter Schlechtriem, Recent Developments in International Sales Law, 18 IsRAEL
L. REV. 309, 320 (1983) ("It is still doubtful, however, what to do with property damage
caused by defects of the goods; thus, whether-as in the old example from the digests
(D.19.1.13 pr.)--the buyer of sick cattle can recover for the loss of his healthy herd only
according to the uniform sales law, or whether he can have recourse to the domestic law of
torts in a case where he has failed, for example, to give timely notice."). This problem
should be solved according to the domestic law to which international private law rules refer.
For a discussion of the different rules governing the interaction between tortious and
contractual liability and Art. 5, see Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and
Contract-Opening a New Frontier?, 21 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 467 (1988).
'" For the distinction between gaps praeter legem and gaps intra legem, see Henri
Deschenaux, Der Einleitungstitel, in 2 ScHwEizERISCHES PRiVATRECHT 95 (Max Gutzwiller
et al. eds., 1967); Wahl, supra note 130, at 126.
187 Bonell, supra note 82, at 75 also stresses that "[a] first condition for the existence of
a gap in the sense of Article 7(2) is that the case at hand relates to 'matters governed by [the]
Convention.' Issues which are not within the scope of the Convention have been deliberately
left to the competence of the existing non-unified national laws."
18 Ibis expression is borrowed from H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961), where
the author states that "[wihichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the
communication of standards of behavior, these, however smoothly they work over the great
mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove
indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture.... [U]ncertainty at the
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different approaches exist which are based respectively (a) on the application
of the general principles of the convention, i.e., on the "true code ap-
proach", 9 (b) on external legal principles,' 90 i.e., on the "meta-Code"
approach,' 9' and (c) on a combination of the foregoing approaches
according to which one is supposed to first apply the general principles of
the convention, in the absence of which, however, the judge will resort to the
rules of international private law.'9
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of
communication concerning matters of fact." (emphasis in original).
'8 According to the "true code approach" (the terminology is borrowed from William D.
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 291, 292 (1962)),
which corresponds to the so-called "internal analogy approach" (see, as for the use of the
latter expression, KRrrzER, supra note 114, at 117), "a court should look no further than the
code [or any other kind of legislation] itself for solution to [sic] disputes governed by it-its
purposes and policies should dictate the result even where there is no express language on
point" (Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-
103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REv. 655, 657 (1977)). In other
words, a true code "is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and independent to
enable it to be administered in accordance with its own basic policies." Hawkland, supra at
292 (footnote omitted).
90 This approach seems to be favored in common law; see, for example, Dore &
Defranco, supra note 52, at 63, where the authors also assert that U.C.C. § 1-103, which
provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of the Act, the principles of law
and equity.. . shall supplement its provisions," "appears to support [the thesis of the U.C.C.
being based on] the common law approach." Id. at 64.
However, other commentators, basing their thesis on U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (which states that
"[tihis Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies") affirm that "[t]he effect of this language [§ 1-102] is that the code not only has the
force of law, but is itself a source of law" (Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 330, 333 (1951), i.e., that the
U.C.C. is based on the civil law approach. The solution of the problem concerning the
methodology adopted by U.C.C. depends on approach one takes to solve "[t]he tension that
exists between section 1-103, which directs the courts to supplement the Code with outside
law, and the true code methodology of section 1-102(1), in which courts find answers within
the Code framework" (Hillman, supra note 189, at 659) (emphasis in original).
"' For this expression see Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships
under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part I: The Methodological Problem and the Civil
Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1977).
'92 For references to the three approaches, see, for example, KRnTZER, supra note 114, at
117; Jan Kropholler, Der Ausschlufl des IPR im Einheitlichen Kaufgesetz, 38 RABELS
ZErrSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 372, 382 (1974).
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As can easily be deduced from the rules contemplated in Articles 2 and
17 of the 1964 Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods, the drafters of
the 1964 Hague Conventions, in line with earlier drafts,' chose the first
approach. Indeed, "Article 2 of the ULIS excludes the application of rules
of international private law except in a few instances,"' and ULIS Article
17 provides that "the general principles underlying the [1964] Uniform Law
are to be used to fill the law's gaps. This has the intended negative
implication that courts may not refer to the domestic law of the country
whose law would otherwise apply under the rules of private international
law. ,, 195
XII. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW
The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention has chosen a solution different from
the criticized one"' upon which the ULIS was based. Indeed, it adopted
the approach which combines the recourse to general principles with an
eventual recourse to the rules of international private law, 97 a choice that
193 The Hague Conventions' approach has already been promoted on the occasion of the
elaboration of earlier drafts, such as the one discussed on the occasion of the 1951 Hague
Conference mentioned supra note; see, for example, Rabel, supra note 46, at 60, where the
author states that "[w]ithin its concerns, however, the text must be self-sufficient. Where a
case is not expressly covered the text is not to be supplemented by the national laws-which
would at once destroy unity-but be construed according to the principles consonant with its
spirit."
19 Harold J. Berman, The Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods: A Constructive
Critique, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 354, 359 (1965) (footnote omitted). For a similar
affirmation, see also Wahl, supra note 130, at 126, where the author, after having listed the
three different approaches to filling gaps praeter legem, states that "the ULIS has adopted the
first method. The text of Article 17, its legislative history as well as the provision
contemplated in Article 2 show that the application of the rules of international private law
had to be limited."
'" Peter Winship, Private International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, 21 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 487, 492 (1988).
'9 The solution adopted by the ULIS has not only been criticized, it has even been
considered as being one of the reasons which led to the rejection of the ULIS. For a similar
affirmation, see Dore & Defranco, supra note 52, at 63, where the authors state that "ULIS's
failure to outline an acceptable method of dealing with omissions was a factor contributing
to its rejection."
'9 For a similar statement, see KRrrzER, supra note 114, at 117, affirming that "(wihen
a matter is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled in it, the Convention's
solution is (i) internal analogy where the Convention contains an applicable general principle;
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is based upon the consideration that "the absolute independence from
domestic law that ULIS had pursued was considered as being unreach-
able." '
As far as the recourse to general principles in filling the gaps is concerned,
one must note that it constitutes a method well-known in civil law coun-
tries.19 In fact, the recourse to general principles in order to fill gaps
"finds precedent in many codes of the Roman-Germanic legal systems, even
though among such codes there are differences."" It is sufficient to recall
Article 12(2) of the Italian Civil Code's Preliminary Provisions which states
that "if a controversy cannot be decided on the ground of a specific
provision, one can resort to similar provisions or analogous matters; if the
question remains doubtful, it shall be settled in conformity with the general
principles of the legal system of the [Italian] State." A similar approach has
also been introduced in other civil law systems, such as that of Austria,201
Czechoslovakia,' Egypt,' Spain,' and others.'
and (ii) reference to external legal principles (the rules of private international law) where the
Convention does not contain an applicable general principle."
98FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 309.
99See, apart from the authors quoted supra note 189, HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 149,
where the author underlines that the provision contemplating the settlement of questions in
conformity with the general principles of the Convention "reflects the approach established
for civil law codes."
FRIGNANi, supra note 7, at 308.
2e See Art. 7 of the Austrian Civil Code [hereinafter ABGB] (1811) ("Where a case
cannot be decided either according to the literal text or the plain meaning of a statute, regard
shall be had to the statutory provisions concerning similar cases .... If the case still remains
doubtful, it shall be decided... on the ground of principles of natural law.").
2 See, for a similar affirmation, Honnold, supra note 128, at 139 (stating that "[tihe
Czechoslovak International Trade Code, drafted under the influence of the 1964 Hague
Convention, calls for the use of the "principles governing" the Trade Code in dealing with
gaps").
203 See Article 1(2) of the Egypt Civil Code (1948). For a reference to this article, see
also Bonell, supra note 82, at 77.
20' See Article 6(2) of the Spanish Civil Code ("Whenever there is no directly applicable
statutory provision, usages must be applied and, absent such usages, the general principles of
the law.").
"5 One must note that even
in countries such as France or the Federal Republic of Germany, where
the approach is not formally imposed by statute, it is taken for granted
that a Code or any other legislation of a more general character must be
considered as more than the mere sum of its individual provisions. In
[Vol. 24:183220
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In common law, the notion of general principles is different from that in
civil law,206 in part, because of the "diverse notion and function of the
'general principles' ",20 and in part because of the different sources from
which the general principles are derived. In fact, in civil law the source is
the legislation, whereas in Anglo-American law, the source is represented by
case law.' In effect, in common law
statutory law is seen as only fixing rules for defined situa-
tions, not as a possible source of general principles. As
such, not only are the statutes traditionally interpreted in a
very strict sense, but if there is no provision specifically
regulating the case at hand, the gap will immediately be
filled by principles and rules of the judge-made common
law. °
XIII. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
As has already been pointed out, the solution adopted by Article 7(2) of
the Vienna Sales Convention is influenced by those that can be found in the
codes of continental Europe. ° This is no surprise, considering that "[tihe
Convention represents a veritable codification of the law on international
sales contracts, intended to replace with respect to the matters governed by
it the existing domestic laws, whether they are embodied in statutes or
fact, it must be interpreted and, if necessary, supplemented on the basis
of the general principles which underlie its specific provisions.
Bonell, supra note 82, at 77. See also 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KMTZ, EINFOHRUNG IN
DIE REcHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEN GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 103 (2nd ed., 1982).
' It has even been said that "the term [general principles] sounds alien to English
lawyers." Neville Brown, General Principles of Law and the English Legal System, in NEW
PERSPECIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 174 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978).
2 FPIGNANi, supra note 7, at 308.
o For a similar statement, see Otto Kahn-Freund, Common Law and Civil Law-Imagin-
ary and Real Obstacles to Assimilation, in NEW PERSPECIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF
EUROPE, supra note 206, at 154 (stating that "in the common law world, the lawyer looks for
his principles in the 'cases,' and the statutes merely fill in details, the "case law" playing the
role of the Codes on the Continent").
29 Bonell, supra note 82, at 77-78.
210 See FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 308 (affirming that the solution adopted by the
continental European codes influenced the solution upon which Article 7(2) first part is
based).
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developed by case law. If there are gaps, it is only logical to try to find a
solution whenever possible within the Convention itself,"2"1 a solution that
complies with the ultimate aim contemplated in Article 7(1), i.e., the
promotion of the Convention's uniform application.
However, to fill the gaps, one can resort to various types of logical
reasoning in order to find a solution within the Convention itself.212 In this
respect, recourse to general principles constitutes only one method of gap-
filling. Therefore one must determine whether Article 7(2) of the Vienna
Sales Convention must be interpreted broadly, i.e., whether it covers other
methods of legal reasoning as well, such as analogical application,2"3 or
whether it is to be interpreted restrictively.2"4
As to this question, one can share the opinion of those legal scholars who
assert not only that the Convention permits both methods, but also that "[i]n
the case of a gap in the Convention the first attempt to be made is to settle
the unsolved question by means of an analogical application of specific
provisions. ' 2 5  However, when the matters expressly settled in the Con-
vention and the matter de quo are not so closely related that it would not be
unjustified to adopt a different solution,216 one must resort to the general
211 Bonell, supra note 82, at 78. A similar conclusion can also be found in AuDrr, supra
note 81, at 50; FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 309.
212 ENDERLELN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 58, point out that Article 7(2)'s major
concern is to make sure that the gaps are "closed... from within the Convention. This is
in line with the aspiration to unify the law which.., is established in the Convention itself"
(emphasis in original).
23 For a clear distinction between analogical application and the recourse to general
principles, see JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES ERNHEITSRECHT 292 (1975).
214 For a brief discussion of this problem see FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 309.
215 Bonell, supra note 82, at 78.
The analogical application as a method of gap-filling has been admitted by other authors
as well; see, for example, ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 58, where the authors
state that
gap-filling can be done, as we believe, by applying such interpretation
methods as extensive interpretation and analogy. The admissibility of
analogy is directly addressed in the wording contained in the CISG
because it is aimed at obtaining, from several comparable rules, one rule
for a not expressly covered fact and/or a general rule under which the fact
can be subsumed."
216 For a similar criterion employed in order to distinguish the analogical approach from
the recourse to general principles, see Bonell, supra note 82, at 79 (stating that if cases
expressly settled by specific provisions and the case in question are so analogous "that it
would be inherently unjust not to adopt the same solution," the gap should be closed by
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principles as contemplated in Article 7(2) of the Convention. This procedure
differs from the analogical application in that it does not resolve the case at
hand solely by extending specific provisions dealing with analogous matters,
"but on the basis of principles and rules which because of their general
character may be applied on a much wider scale."'2 7
What, however, are the general principles upon which the 1980 Uniform
Sales Law is based? Some general principles can be easily identified since
they are expressly provided for by the Uniform Sales Law itself. One such
principle is the principle of good faith2 ' which had already been consid-
ered a general principle under the regime of the ULIS.219 There are,
however, other general principles expressly outlined by the Convention. One
of those is represented by the parties' autonomy,2 which has been defined
as the most important general principle of the Convention.2' This is no
surprise, considering that some legal writers have inferred from this principle
that the Convention plays solely a subsidiary role222 as it provides only for
those cases which the parties neither contemplated nor foresaw. If that is
resorting to the general principles). For a criticism of this criterion, see Mark N. Rosenberg,
The Vienna Convention: Uniformity in Interpretation for Gap-Filling-An Analysis and
Application, 20 AUSTRALLAN Bus. L. REV. 442, 451 (affirming that "[tihere are inherent
problems with an 'inherently unjust' test").
217 Bonell, supra note 82, at 80.
2'8 The good faith principle has been recognized as one of the general principles expressly
laid down by the Convention, for example, by AuDrr, supra note 81, at 51 (stating that good
faith is one of the general principles, even though it must be considered a mere instrument
of interpretation); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 59 (where the authors list the
good faith principle among those general principles "which do not necessarily have to be
reflected in individual rules"); HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 97, at 49 (affirming that
the good faith principle represents the only general principles expressly provided for by the
Convention).
219 "Good faith" has been considered a general principle under the ULIS for example by
Wahl, supra note 130, at 135.
20 The parties' autonomy has been considered a general principle for example by
HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 47, who even stated that "[t]he dominant theme of the
Convention is the role of the contract construed in the light of commercial practice and
usage--a theme of deeper significance than may be evident at first glance."
22, For a reference to this definition, see KRrTZER, supra note 114, at 114.
m For this thesis, see, for example, HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 48 (stating that "the
Convention's rules play a supporting role, supplying answers to problems that the parties have
failed to solve by contract"). For a similar conclusion, see Sono, supra note 36, at 14
(affirming that "the rules contained in the Convention are only supplementary for those cases
where the parties did not provide otherwise in their contract").
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true, the conclusion which inevitably must be drawn is that in case of
conflict between the parties' autonomy and any other general principle, the
former always prevails,2 3 "a result contrary to the Uniform Commercial
Code where principles of 'good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care'
prevail over party autonomy."
There are also other expressly enunciated general principles, such as the
principle according to which "the agreement between the parties is not
subject to any formal requirement (Articles 11 and 29(l)),"' except for
the cases provided for by Article 12; the principle according to which widely
known and largely observed usages must be taken into account (Article
9);2 the principle on the ground of which if a party fails to pay the price
or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on
it (Article 78).27 One also finds the principle "according to which any
notice or other kind of communication made or given after the conclusion
of the contract becomes effective on dispatch (Article 27)."'
Nevertheless, most general principles have not been expressly provided for
by the Convention.229 Consequently, they must be deduced from its
specific provisions by the means of an analysis-however, not compara-
tive--of the contents of such provisions "in order to see whether they
can be considered as an expression of a more general principle, as such
capable of being applied also to cases different from those specifically
regulated,"" a method which has permitted the extraction of several
223 E. Allan Farnsworth, Rights and Obligations of the Seller, in WIENER OBEREINKOM-
MEN VON 1980 OBER DEN INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF 84 (1985), draws the same
conclusion ("[Ijn case of a conflict between the contract and the Convention, it is the
contract-not the Convention-that controls.").
2 KRrZER, supra note 114, at 115.
2" Bonell, supra note 82, at 80.
26 See, for a similar affirmation, Herber, supra note 100, at 94.
22" For this principle, see AuDrr, supra note 81, at 51.
2 Bonell, supra note 82, at 80.
229 This is common understanding; see, for all, AUDIT, supra note 81, at 51.
20 One cannot share the opinion according to which comparative law could be useful in
order to identify such general principles; for this opinion see, for example, Bonell, supra note
82, at 81. Indeed, "[i]t is... not possible to obtain the Convention's general principles from
an analysis prepared by comparison of the laws of the most important legal systems of the
Contracting States... as it was supported, in some cases, in regard to Article 17 ULIS....
The wording of the Convention does in no way support the application of this methods [sic]
(emphasis in original)." ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 60.
23' Bonell, supra note 82, at 80.
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general principles. Among those are, for instance, the concept of "reason-
ableness, 232 according to which "the parties must conduct themselves
according to the standard of the reasonable person.2 33 However, even
though it cannot be doubted that the concept of "reasonableness" is a general
principle2  (it has even been defined as a "fundamental principle" of the
Convention235), it is uncertain what kind of reasonableness one must take
into account. This problem must be solved by taking the Convention's
international character into account.'
There are other general principles which can be extracted from the
provisions dealing with specific matters. For example, one can recall the
principle of "mitigation"'23 which provides that the parties must take
reasonable measures to limit damages resulting from the breach of the
contract (Article 77).2m One is also reminded of the principle according
to which the parties must not venire contra factum proprium239 which
results in preventing "a person from contradicting a representation on which
another person has reasonably relied."2' One also finds the principle of
the favor contractustl "which means that, whenever possible, a solution
should be adopted in favour of the valid existence of the contract and against
its premature termination on the initiative of one of the parties." 2 There
232 It is common understanding that the concept of "reasonableness" constitutes a general
principle; see, e.g., AuDrr, supra note 81, at 51; FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 308; Herber,
supra note 100, at 94.
233 SCHLECHTRiEM, UNIFORM LAW OF SALES, supra note 166, at 39.
n4 See Maskow, supra note 113, at 57 ("[N]obody can doubt that the concept of
reasonableness is a general principle of the convention.").
23s As for this evaluation, see SCHLECHTRIEM, EmnHEIrLICHES UN-KAUFRECHT, supra note
166, at 25.
' In that regard one could say that the concept of reasonableness must be interpreted in
a way that its acceptance in the different groups of States is most probable.
2 For this principle, see, for example, HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 155.
3 This principle is considered one of the general principles of the Convention also by
AUDrr, supra note 81, at 52; FRIGNANI, supra note 7, at 308.
For similar affirmations, see, for example, Edrsi, supra note 93, at 2-12; Herber, supra
note 100, at 94; Maskow, supra note 113, at 57.
'4 HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 153.
24a For a reference to the favor contractus principle, see Rosenberg, supra note 216, at
452, where the author defines the favor contractus principle as a rle according to which
"where possible, solutions favouring the maintenance of the contract should be adopted in
preference to solutions resulting in the premature termination of the contract on the initiative
of one party."
242 Bonell, supra note 82, at 81.
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is also the civil law-based24 3 rule that limits reparable damages to those
that are foreseeable,' as well as the principle according to which the
parties must provide the cooperation needed "in carrying out the interlocking
steps of an international sales transaction,"'' 5 a duty which is closely
related to the one which calls for "communication of information that is
obviously needed by a trading partner."'
Of course, other rules are considered general principles as well, but
generally there is no common understanding as far as their qualification is
concerned.2'7
XIV. GAPS PRAETER LEGEM AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 7(2) states the gaps praeter legem are to be filled in conformity
with the Convention's general principles. Quid iuris in the case in which the
243 Some authors consider the foreseeability rule outlined by the Vienna Sales Convention
as being based on common law; see, for example, HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 97,
at 333 ("[Ihe limitation to foreseeable damages comes from Anglo-American law."); GERT
REINHART, UN-KAUFRECHT 170 (1991) (stating the same).
This view has been opposed by several authors favoring the view that the foreseeability rule
is based upon French law, in particular upon Pothier's teachings. In that regard is has been
stated that "Pothier's views, as usual, were avidly received by the 19th-century English courts
and formed the basis, in this instance, of the contemplation doctrine, as formulated in the
celebrated decision of Hadley v. Baxendale." REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS. ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 830 (1988). For a more
detailed discussion of the origin of the foreseeability rule and its reception in different
countries, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Der Einflufl Pothiers auf das rdmisch-hollindische
Recht in Siidafrika, 102 ZEITSCHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG. GERMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG
178-185 (1985); Franco Ferrari, Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages
in Contract Law, 53 LA. L. REv. 1257 (1993); Franco Ferrari, Prevedibilita del danno e
contemplation rule, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 760 (1993); Detlef Kdnig, Voraussehbarkeit des
Schadens als Grenze vertraglicher Haftung, in DAS HAAGER EINHEITICHE KAUFGESETZ UND
DAS DEuTscHE ScHuLDREcHT. KOLLoQUIUM zuM 65. GEBURTSTAG VON ERNST VON
CAEMMERER 75 (Hans G. Leser & Wolfgang Frhr. Marschall von Bieberstein eds., 1973).
244 FRIGNAN, supra note 7, at 308, lists this rule among the general principles of the
Convention. The same is true in regard to Maskow, supra note 113, at 57.
24 KRITZER, supra note 114, at 115.
246 HONNOLD, supra note 59, at 155.
24 It has been suggested, for instance, that the orientation toward specific performance
is also a general principle; ENDERLEiN & MASKOW, supra note 102, at 60, favor this thesis.
In contrast, specific performance does not seem to be considered a general principle by
FRIGNANi, supra note 7, at 308, where the author does not include it in his list of general
principles.
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interpreter cannot make recourse to similar principles in solving the case at
hand?
To solve such problems, the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, after some
uncertainties,' laid down the rule according to which, absent general
principles, the interpreter must resort to the "law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law (Article 7(2))." This "subsidiary meth-
od"' 9 found support under the 1964 Hague Conventions,' even though
the prevalent opinion was to the contrary." Indeed, most authors
supported the view that, absent general principles of the convention with
which to fill the gaps, such gaps should be filled not by making recourse to
the rules of private international law, but by resorting to the general
principles of the law, 2 i.e., to the so-called allgemeine Rechtsgrund-
sitze,"3 defined for the occasion as "principles and rules which are most
commonly adopted within the different Contracting States and/or particularly
suited for the case at hand."'  However, this approach has been justly
criticized as well. In fact, it was argued that the identification of such
principles by interpreters would be difficult if not even impossible,
considering that not even specialists have been able to identify such
principles. 5
For an overview of the dispute which finally led to the solution adopted by the
Uniform Sales Law, see SCHLECHTRIEM, EINHEITLICHES UN-KAUPREcHT, supra note 166, at
23.
For this qualification, see AuDrr, supra note 81, at 52.
o For an overview of the authors who supported the possibility of making recourse to
the rules of private international law even under the Hague Conventions, see Herber, supra
note 100, at 93.
"' For a similar conclusion, see Bonell, supra note 82, at 82 ("With respect to ULIS it
was already questioned whether turning to domestic law should be permitted if a gap could
not be filled by general principles which could be extracted from the uniform law itself. The
prevailing view was opposed to this approach.").
2S2 For a recent discussion of the notion of "general principles of law," see Guido Alpa,
General Principles of Law, 1 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1994).
2 This expression is borrowed from Wahl, supra note 130, at 139.
z Bonell, supra note 82, at 82.
For a similar criticism, see Jan Kropholler, Der "Ausschlufl" des IPR im Einheitlichen
UN-Kaufrecht, RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AusLANDIscHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 380 (1974).
1994]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Nowadays, such disputes have no reason to exist: the convention states
that, absent general principles of the Convention, i.e., as ultima ratio,M
one not only is allowed to make recourse to the rules of private international
law: one is obliged to do so." This does not mean that recourse to the
rules of private international law, absent general principles, should be
abused. 58 Recourse to the rules of private international law "represents
under the... uniform law a last resort to be used only if and to the extent
that a solution cannot be found either by analogical application of specific
provisions or by the application of "general principles" underlying the
uniform law as such."' 9
From what has been said so far, one main conclusion can be drawn:
ultimately, it is the interpreter's task to decide whether the 1980 Uniform
Sales Law is really a uniform law, i.e., whether universalism prevails over
nationalism, whether any progress has been made since the enactment of the
national codes which overturned what could have been a basis for a new ius
commune. Unlike the Hague Conventions, the 1980 Vienna Sales Conven-
tion provides an ideal framework which should permit a positive answer to
the foregoing question.
256 For a similar evaluation, see Bonell, supra note 86, at 25; Herber, supra note 100, at
93.
" For a similar conclusion, see Bonell, supra note 82, at 83, stating that the "recourse
to domestic law for the purpose of filling gaps under certain circumstances is not only
admissible, but even obligatory."
258 The danger of an abuse of the recourse to the rules of private international law is
considerable, since the gaps can easily be filled by virtue of the rules of private international
law: "It is enough to state that no general principles can be found and therefore the only way
out it to resort to private international law." E6rsi, supra note 93, at 2-12.
" Bonell, supra note 82, at 83.
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